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Abstract 
As the vaccine controversy continues to deepen in the United States, this dissertation 
research addresses how we can better understand and deal with this issue in respect to 
public policy in general and public health policy in particular.  Based upon original data 
from a nationwide Internet survey of 1,213 adults conducted in 2010, this study 
scrutinizes ways in which individuals’ values and beliefs, notably cultural 
predispositions, shape their differing opinions on the benefits and risks associated with 
childhood vaccinations and controversial vaccination policies, including mandatory 
vaccinations and religious/philosophical exemptions, and key related issues of 
governance.  This study also attempts to explain how parents’ subjective expected 
utility of vaccinations (derived from their perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks) and 
their beliefs regarding current vaccine policies actually translate into their vaccination-
related behaviors in regards to the immunization of their own children. 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) explains how individuals’ grid-group 
cultural orientations shape their perceptions regarding vaccine benefits and risks at both 
the societal and individual levels.  As Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky’s cultural 
theory of risk perception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) claims, empirical findings 
derived from robust regression analysis with heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
estimation of errors and Bayesian posterior simulations reveal that those with a strong 
hierarch orientation tend to envision greater vaccination benefits and smaller risks, 
while those with a strong fatalist tendency are inclined to emphasize risks and downplay 
benefits.  Situated between hierarchs and fatalists, egalitarians are prone to perceive 
greater benefits and smaller risks than individualists. 
xii 
Knowing that the benefits and the risks of vaccinations are understood as a 
sociopolitical construct and a reflection of the competing values and beliefs of different 
members of society (notably manifested in the form of cultural predispositions), this 
dissertation research proceeds to examine whether people still hold similar (value 
motivated, rather than factual evidence based) reasoning patterns when they are 
involved in policy debates on vaccination.  The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) 
seeks to explain how individuals’ fundamental values regarding a preferred social 
ordering shape their opinions on controversial vaccination policies and key related 
issues of governance.  As Aaron Wildavsky’s cultural theory of policy preference 
formation (Wildavsky, 1987) posits, empirical findings grounded on robust regression 
analysis with heteroskedasticity consistent error covariance estimation and Bayesian 
posterior simulations show that cultural biases have a significant impact on the 
formation of preferences toward various vaccination policies and governance issues. 
Hierarchs and egalitarians are more likely to be pro-vaccination, while individualists 
and (especially) fatalists tend to oppose this view.  Hierarchs advocate mandatory 
vaccination, disapprove of religious and philosophical exemptions, and believe that the 
government, not parents, should control childhood immunizations.  By contrast, fatalists 
are inclined to reject mandatory vaccination policy in favor of religious and 
philosophical exemptions and the role of parents in determining vaccination of children. 
Egalitarians’ pro-vaccination inclination is relatively weaker and less consistent than 
hierarchs’, while individualists’ anti-vaccination leanings are overall less robust than 
those of fatalists. 
Government health authorities can utilize knowledge concerning the way 
xiii 
individuals’ cultural orientations shape vaccine benefit-risk perception and policy 
preference to improve risk communication between the government, experts, and the 
lay public and to encourage “desirable” (public health enhancing) changes in the 
general public’s attitude toward vaccine risks and related policies.  However, this 
assertion alone does not provide much assistance in terms of practical implications as to 
how an actual policy outcome can be realized through changes not only in individuals’ 
attitudes and thoughts, but also in their behaviors.  This line of thought led to the third 
empirical chapter (Chapter 5), which essentially examines how American parents’ 
policy related beliefs (e.g., their perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks and related 
policy preferences) actually translate into their behaviors regarding child vaccinations. 
The results of an empirical analysis using nested dichotomies logistic regression reveal 
that parents who perceive high levels of societal and individual benefit from 
vaccination, a high (very favorable) benefit-risk ratio, and low levels of individual risk 
are more strongly motivated to have their own child (or children) receive all 
recommended vaccines.  In addition, parents who more strongly support mandatory 
vaccination policy and are not in favor of religious and philosophical exemptions and 
parental decision-making rights regarding children’s immunizations are more strongly 
motivated to have their own child(ren) receive all recommended vaccines. 
The most important element of these findings is that the vaccine policy debate 
and related vaccination behaviors are not solely based upon efficacy in reduction of 
disease or the resulting societal benefits and costs.  Rather, it actually gains 
considerable momentum from the clash of worldviews.  An intrinsic value dimension, 
notably in the form of grid-group cultural orientation, is reflected in the way this debate 
xiv 
and related vaccination behaviors have come to stand in for an overarching contest 
among competing sets of societal norms.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 A recent pertussis (or whooping cough) outbreak in California raises substantial and 
potentially dire public health implications for the US population.  As of December 31, 
2010, ten infants had died in that outbreak, and 9,273 whooping cough cases were 
confirmed (California Department of Public Health, 2011).  If estimated unconfirmed 
cases are also considered, this outbreak is the largest in California in the past fifty years1 
(The New York Times, 2010).  There are a number of plausible explanations for the 
resurgence of whooping cough, which was previously regarded as an eradicated disease 
in the United States.  However, most experts argue that its resurgence was a direct result 
of the decreasing vaccination rate and subsequently weakening “herd immunity” among 
some communities and ethnic groups (Baker et al., 2010; Luman et al. 2005; Smith and 
Stevenson, 2008; Wooten, Luman and Baker, 2007).  Furthermore, experts warn that if 
this trend toward reduced vaccination rates continues, additional diseases once believed 
to have been eliminated in the U.S. will also resurface. 
Vaccinations involve benefit/risk tradeoffs at both the collective, societal level 
and for individuals.  For society as a whole, vaccines prevent the spread of infectious 
diseases, while at the individual level, vaccines protect from potentially life-threatening 
illnesses.  At the societal level, government health authorities face a dilemma in 
deciding between the importance of employing (potentially coercive) programs for 
safeguarding public health and that of allowing individuals to make their own choices 
about vaccinating themselves or their children.  Individuals run a risk, however small, 
of experiencing side effects that can range from minor to life threatening.  In deciding 
                                                
1 More recently, in late February of 2011, concerns about measles outbreaks in the US resulted 
from air-travel exposure of hundreds of travelers by an infected passenger who, apparently, had 
made the choice not to be vaccinated (The Washington Post, 2011). 
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whether to vaccinate, a stark trade-off is posed; each time an individual’s (or parent’s) 
concerns about side effects results in a decision not to vaccinate, they or their child 
remain vulnerable to preventable infectious diseases while simultaneously weakening 
the “herd immunity” of the overall population by increasing the number of potentially 
infectious carriers.  
Improvement of public health by immunization through vaccinations has been a 
consistent policy in the US for decades.  In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the federal 
government established a nationwide vaccination policy based upon the Vaccination 
Assistance Act (Calandrillo and Hall, 2004; Rein et al., 2006).  Due to this act, by the 
late 1960s, several states established mandatory vaccination policies for children upon 
school entry against an array of infectious diseases, including measles, polio, diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus.  By the late 1970’s, all fifty states had adopted this vaccination 
requirement.  Currently, all states require vaccinations against measles, polio, rubella, 
and diphtheria.  Vaccinations against other diseases are either required or recommended 
by the various state governments (Orenstein and Hinman, 1999; Ridgway, 1999). 
However, some vaccinations may result in adverse reactions.  These reactions are 
generally minor and include temporary pain or swelling in the injection area (Salmon, 
Moulton and Halsey, 2004), but systemic symptoms such as fever, headaches, and 
vomiting may occur.  Though extremely rare, and though a causal link has yet to be 
verified, severe allergic reactions resulting in brain damage have been reported in 
infants after receiving vaccines (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008).  In 
order to address the possible relationship of these rare and scientifically unverified but 
potentially grave side effects of vaccines, the federal government established the 
3 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in 1986.  The National Childhood Vaccine 
Injury Program, based upon this act, provides compensation for injury or death resulting 
from an adverse reaction to a vaccination without requiring a confirmatory investigation 
of the responsible party, through a federal “no-fault” system (Barringer et al., 2008; 
Elliott, Narayan and Nasmith, 2008; Ridgway, 1999; Schwartz and Mahshigian, 1987; 
but see Widman and Hochberg, 2008).  In addition to offering compensation, current 
public health policy also provides avenues for vaccine avoidance.  Currently, all fifty 
states allow medical exemption from vaccinations for those children who can be 
expected to develop serious allergic reactions.  Another forty-eight states, excluding 
Mississippi and West Virginia, allow for religious exemption from vaccination.  In 
twenty states2, a philosophical (non-religious belief) exemption is also permitted 
(Kasprak, 2004). 
In sum, vaccine policy generally strives for near universal vaccinations to 
maintain herd immunity levels for the population at large, while at the same time 
providing the means to “opt out.”  From this array of different policy directions, the 
government’s struggle between enforcement of vaccination requirements for the benefit 
of public health and provisions for individual rights based upon religious or 
philosophical convictions is evident.  Proponents of mandatory vaccinations argue that 
the government should limit the scope of religious and philosophical exemptions (which, 
if widely exercised, will result in a declining vaccination rate) because in their view, the 
benefits of freedom from infectious diseases, both at the individual and societal level, 
far outweigh the costs of restricted parental choice or the physical risks posed by 
                                                
2 These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  
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vaccinations.  Therefore, proponents urge that exemptions be limited only to those 
based upon verified medical reasons (Salmon et al., 2005).  By contrast, vaccination 
opponents argue that the focus should now be shifted to the risks of vaccinations 
because the threat of infectious diseases has been diminished in modern societies, and 
because individuals (and parents) should have the right to make decisions about 
vaccinations based upon their personal beliefs (Mariner, Annas and Glantz, 2005; PBS 
Frontline, 2010; Wallace, 2009; Woo et al., 2004).  
In the face of the reemerging threat of preventable deadly diseases and in the 
midst of the vaccine risk controversy, it is of critical importance that we understand 
how individuals formulate their decision of whether or not to vaccinate.  In so doing, 
this study seeks to answer the following questions: what explains the differences within 
the general public in (a) perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks, (b) related policy 
preferences, and (c) parental behavior with regard to vaccinating child(ren)?  Based on 
theories regarding risk perceptions, formation of policy preferences, and how 
perceptions and preferences translate into behaviors, the three empirical chapters of this 
dissertation seek to answer these questions with a systemic approach.  Chapter 2 
discusses Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky’s cultural theory and related measures 
that provide the basis of theoretical and empirical analyses of this study.  Then, the first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 3) examines how individuals’ cultural predispositions 
influence their perceptions pertaining to vaccine benefits and risks at both the societal 
and individual levels; The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) seeks to explain how 
individuals’ fundamental values regarding a preferred social ordering shape their 
opinions on controversial vaccination policies and key related issues of governance; 
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The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) essentially examines how American parents’ 
policy related beliefs (e.g., their perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks and related 
policy preferences) actually translate into their behaviors regarding child vaccinations. 
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the theoretical contributions of the research findings 
reported in the aforementioned three empirical chapters and concludes with a discussion 
on some practical implications for future policy directions for government health 
authorities.  This chapter also discusses limitations of this research and suggests future 
research directions. 
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Chapter 2. Cultural Theory and Cultural Type 
Much of the previous research examining the ways in which individuals’ values and 
beliefs translate into benefit/risk perceptions, policy preferences and behaviors seeks to 
understand the hierarchically structured nature of personal values and beliefs (Rokeach 
1973; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz 1992; Verplanken and Holland 2002; 
Jacoby 2006; but see Tetlock 1986; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Maio and Olson 
1998).  In the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), for instance, Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith argue that a hierarchical belief system is grounded in an individual’s 
enduring deep core beliefs, the “foundational normative and ontological axioms” 
regarding qualities of human nature, priority of ultimate values, and distributive justice 
(1993, 31).  Deep core beliefs manifest themselves in policy core beliefs which are 
related to “fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving 
normative axioms of deep core,” such as orientation on substantive policy conflicts 
(e.g., environmental protection versus economic development) (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993, 31; Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
Finally, secondary aspects are essentially associated with “instrumental decisions and 
information searches necessary to implement policy core” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993, 31). 
2.1. Grid-Group Cultural Theory Framework 
Of particular interest among the various components of a personal belief system are 
grid-group cultural orientations (as deep core beliefs) that may have direct bearings on 
individuals’ vaccine benefit/risk perceptions, vaccination policy preferences, and related 
behaviors.  Cultural theory of risk perception and policy preference formation posits 
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that people form conceptions of societal danger and preferred policies in ways that will 
sustain their preferred “way of life” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).  Here, “culture” is 
defined by the manner in which an individual relates to society.  Anthropologist Mary 
Douglas (1970) and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky (1987) argue that an 
individual’s social relationships can be explained by two conceptual dimensions of 
sociality: group and grid.  Group refers to the degree to which individuals’ social 
relations are governed by group membership or “bounded units” within a society 
(Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990, 5).  This dimension is related to the question of 
“Who am I?” in the context of society.  One can answer this question of identity by 
observing that “individuals belong to a strong group, a collective, that makes decisions 
binding on all members or that their ties to others are weak in that their choices bind 
only themselves” (Wildavsky 1987, 6).  Grid indicates to what degree individuals’ 
social relationships are determined by “externally imposed prescriptions” such as rules 
or social norms (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990, 5).  This dimension is related to 
the question of “What shall I do?” in the context of socially constructed institutional 
coercion.  One can answer this question of action by “responding that the individual is 
subject to many or few prescriptions, a free spirit or a spirit tightly constrained” 
(Wildavsky 1987, 6).  So, the strength or weakness of “group boundaries” (group) and 
the number, nature, and diversity of the various “prescriptions” (grid) enacted upon 
individuals formulate their culture, i.e. “shared values legitimating social practices” 
(Wildavsky 1987, 6).  Based upon these two dimensions of sociality are four different 
types of individuals holding distinctive cultural orientations: egalitarians, individualists, 
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hierarchs and fatalists (Dake, 1991; Jenkins-Smith and Smith, 1994; Rayner, 1992; 
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990). 
                   Figure 1. Grid-Group Cultural Theory Framework     
 
Hierarchs hold strong group and grid orientations and fear deviation from 
established rules and social disorder.  Their morals center on institutionalized authority, 
and they justify inequality among the members of society based upon their beliefs that 
specialization and division of labor in a stratified society can enhance societal efficiency 
and effectiveness in comparison with any alternative social structure.  Therefore, they 
confer much credit on experts’ opinion.  They tend to be loyal to the group with which 
they affiliate, and believe that individual members of society are supposed to sacrifice 
themselves for society as a whole.  Meanwhile, Egalitarians possess strong group and 
weak grid orientations.  Fairness and equality are their social norms of pursuit, and they 
Group 
Grid 
Strong Weak 
Strong 
Weak 
Hierarchs 
(Institutionalized 
Egalitarian
(Equality) 
Fatalist
(Life is 
Individualist
(Liberty
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dislike any kind of social/institutional coercion or authority unless they are the product 
of consensus among the members of their own group.  As sectarians, they tend to make 
substantial commitments to voluntary activities geared towards the reduction of various 
societal inequalities based on race, gender, income, and other types of social cleavages.  
Egalitarians often dislike big businesses, as they believe their commercial activities 
cause social inequality and legitimize unconstrained self-interest (Kahan, Braman, 
Gastil, Slovic and Mertz 2007, 469).  Third are the individualists, who have weak group 
and grid orientations and do not consider themselves to be subject to control by others 
or existing institutional constraints.  Their moral base is self-regulation, and they prefer 
contract-based social relations, which is the profound normative principle of the modern 
free market system.  Individualists who care about individual freedom and liberty 
unmistakably dislike institutional coercion and government regulations based upon 
experts’ opinions, and value the idea that individuals can freely compete with one 
another in order to achieve a desired goal, even when such competition results in 
apparent winners and losers and consequential inequality among the members of 
society.  Finally, Fatalists retain weak group and strong grid orientations and choose to 
cope with erratic events in a random world, instead of trying to manage or learn from 
them.  These are the people who are passively obedient to institutional coercion and 
think that they cannot do anything about what will happen to them.  For this cultural 
type, life is just a matter of luck: fatalists usually do not want to engage in any kind of 
collective action, if possible. 
Since its introduction in the seventies and eighties, the grid-group cultural theory 
has been proven to hold great ramifications in explaining a wide variety of policy 
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issues, including industry and economic development (Wildavsky, 1986), technology 
(Kahan et al., 2008), climate change (Jones, 2011), gun control (Kahan, Braman, and 
Gastil, 2006), and various risks (Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Swedlow et al., 2009; 
Wildavksy and Dake, 1990).  However, especially with regard to the empirical research 
following the introduction of cultural theory by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, 
there is a critical methodological issue yet to be resolved: how can cultural type be 
identified?  This is an important question to answer because cultural orientation 
measures that have been widely employed in the majority of empirical cultural theory 
works since Wildavsky and Dake (1990) hold some conceptual inconsistency with the 
theoretical postulations originally suggested by Douglas and Widavsky (Kahan, 2011).  
Scholars who follow Wildavsky and Dake’s tradition of cultural orientation measures 
usually use several cultural orientation scales designed to measure individuals’ 
orientations toward each of four different quadrants of cultural types.  The problem is 
that it is possible that a survey respondent simultaneously scores high on multiple, 
competing cultural orientation measures, which should not be the case according to the 
original cultural theory that assumes that individuals hold one of four mutually exclusive 
cultural types.  Though the traditional way of measuring individuals’ cultural 
orientations has been very useful in explicating how individuals’ cultural orientations, 
as more intrinsic values and beliefs within hierarchically structured belief systems, form 
their differing opinions on issues regarding various risks, related policies, and 
behaviors, in the following sections of this chapter, therefore, I discuss how to 
overcome such methodological limitations and seek to find an appropriate way of 
empirical identification of individuals’ cultural type.  
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2.2. Identification of Cultural Type 
The conventional approach to identify cultural type of individuals based on survey 
methods uses multiple survey questions designed to measure each individual 
respondent’s propensity toward each of the four cultural types.  Typically, survey 
respondents are asked to place themselves on a cultural orientation scale, and then their 
scores are aggregated (or averaged) to produce an index for each of the cultural types.  
Comparing these cultural orientation indices, the one that the respondent scores highest 
on is considered that respondent’s cultural type. 
 Another way to identify an individual’s cultural type that I am proposing here is 
to use classification functions derived from linear discriminant analysis using the 
aforementioned cultural orientation indices as predictors of an individual’s membership 
in one of four mutually exclusive cultural types.  In order to identify each individual’s 
cultural type, a classification function that essentially shows a relationship between the 
cultural orientation indices and a cultural type is estimated for each cultural type: a total 
of four classification functions are estimated.  Then, an individual respondent’s four 
cultural orientation indices are inserted into each classification function to calculate a 
classification score for each cultural type.  Each individual is assigned to the cultural 
type for which he or she has the highest classification score. 
2.2.1. Survey Data  
In order to evaluate and compare these two identification approaches more systemically, 
I use original data collected from nationwide Internet and telephone surveys of 2,718 
American adults conducted in 2011.  The University of Oklahoma Institutional Review 
Board approved the survey and overall research design for Human Research Participant 
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Protection.  The Internet survey sample (a total of 2,125) was drawn from Survey 
Sampling International’s (SSI) regular panel of approximately 400,000 Internet survey 
recruits whose demographic characteristics approximates national census 
characteristics.  The telephone survey sample consisted of a total of 593 individual 
respondents who were selected using the Random Digit Dialing method.  The average 
age (in years) of survey participants was 48.40. 52.2% of total survey respondents were 
female, approximately 82% were non-Hispanic whites, and 40.9% had a college degree.  
Survey participants’ median annual household income was between $40,000 and 
$50,000. 
2.2.2. Cultural Theory Measures 
In order to identify an individual’s cultural type, the questions presented in Table 1 
were provided to the survey respondents.  Survey respondents were asked to use drop-
down boxes to assign a number from four (most agree) to one (least agree) for each 
statement corresponding to each of four cultural types.  The survey questions were 
programed in such a way that the survey respondents could use a ranking number only 
once – they were forced to self-identify one unique cultural type with which they most 
associate– and they were supposed to assign a rank to each cultural type statement  
Table 1. Cultural Type Measures 
Cultural type Measure 
Hierarch 
I am more comfortable when I know who is, and who is not, a 
part of my group, and loyalty to the group is important to me. 
I prefer to know who is in charge and to have clear rules and 
procedures; those who are in charge should punish those who 
break the rules. I like to have my responsibilities clearly 
defined, and I believe people should be rewarded based on the 
position they hold and their competence. Most of the time, I 
trust those with authority and expertise to do what is right for 
society. (1=Least Agree to 4=Most Agree) 
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Egalitarian 
Much of society today is unfair and corrupt, and my most 
important contributions are made as a member of a group that 
promotes justice and equality. Within my group, everyone 
should play an equal role without differences in rank or 
authority. It is easy to lose track of what is important, so I 
have to keep a close eye on the actions of my group. It is not 
enough to provide equal opportunities; we also have to try to 
make outcomes more equal. (1=Least Agree to 4=Most 
Agree) 
Individualist 
Groups are not all that important to me. I prefer to make my 
own way in life without having to follow other peoples’ rules. 
Rewards in life should be based on initiative, skill, and hard 
work, even if that results in inequality. I respect people based 
on what they do, not the positions or titles they hold. I like 
relationships that are based on negotiated “give and take,” 
rather than on status. Everyone benefits when individuals are 
allowed to compete. (1=Least Agree to 4=Most Agree) 
Fatalist 
Life is unpredictable and I have little control. I have to live by 
lots of rules, but I don’t get to make them. My fate in life is 
determined mostly by chance. I can’t become a member of the 
groups that make most of the important decisions affecting 
me. Getting along in life is largely a matter of doing the best I 
can with what comes my way, so I focus on taking care of 
myself and the people closest to me. (1=Least Agree to 
4=Most Agree) 
 
before they advanced to the next statement. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of self-identified cultural types of survey 
respondents.  Out of 1,666 valid responses, 676 (40%) respondents self-identified that 
they are individualists, 376 (23%), hierarchs, 310 (19%), egalitarians, and the remaining 
307 (18%), fatalists, respectively.  In the following analysis, this self-identified cultural  
Table 2. Frequency Table 
Cultural type Frequency Percent 
Hierarch 376 0.23 
Egalitarian 310 0.19 
Individualist 673 0.40 
Fatalist 307 0.18 
Total 1666 1.00 
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type will be used as a reference for evaluating and comparing the two aforementioned 
approaches used to identify the cultural types of each individual respondent (i.e., 
conventional approach and proposed approach using discriminant analysis). 
 Table 3 presents cultural orientation measures that have been most widely used 
in cultural theory research (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Smith, 1994; Silva and Jenkins-
Smith, 2007; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  Using scales from twelve survey items on 
cultural orientations presented in Table 3, survey respondents were asked to rate the 
degree of their agreement with the given statements (related to cultural orientations) on 
a 7-point scale, with high scores meaning strong agreement.  Then, I constructed four 
respective indices for egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchism by taking the mean  
of the three respective survey items.  Cronbach’s Alpha scores, ranging from 0.68 to 
Table 3. Cultural Orientation Measures 
Cultural orientation Measure 
Hierarchism 
The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard to do 
what you are told to do. (1=Strongly Disagree to 
7=Strongly Agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own 
way in the world. (1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly 
Agree) 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict 
and swift punishment on those who break the rules. 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
Hierarchism index Index of above three items (α=0.68) 
 
Egalitarianism 
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the 
distribution of goods more equal. . (1=Strongly Disagree 
to 7=Strongly Agree) 
Society works best if power is shared equally. 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is 
largely determined by forces beyond our control. 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
Egalitarianism index Index of above three items (α=0.76) 
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Individualism 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for 
society to let people succeed or fail on their own. 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own 
way in the world. (1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly 
Agree) 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
Individualism index Index of above three items (α=0.68) 
 
Fatalism 
The most important things that take place in life happen 
by chance. (1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is 
largely determined by forces beyond our control. 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of 
chance. (1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree) 
Fatalism index Index of above three items (α=0.75) 
 
0.76, show that these items are fairly reliable in measuring each cultural orientation of 
interest. 
As presented in Table 4, in order to evaluate the empirical validity of these 
cultural orientation measures, I checked the dimensionality of these measures by 
conducting factor analysis with varimax rotation, and found that these twelve cultural 
orientation items load neatly into four latent dimensions constructing the four mutually 
exclusive cultural orientations suggested in the cultural theory literature (Douglas 1970; 
Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson et al. 1990).  The first three hierarchism 
items, for instance, are loaded high on Factor 4 (hierarchism dimension of cultural 
theory) with factor loadings ranging from 0.64 to 0.78, while showing low factor 
loadings in other remaining factors (ranging from 0.01 to 0.26).  Measures for other 
cultural orientations show similar patterns.  The three egalitarianism items are loaded 
high on Factor 3 (egalitarianism factors) and low on other remaining factors, the three 
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individualism items high on Factor 2 (individualism), and the fatalism items on Factor 1 
(fatalism), respectively.  These four extracted factors explain approximately 65% of 
overall variance in the data, while proportion of variance explained by each latent 
dimension varies from 15% to 18%.  Eigenvalues for each extracted factor range from 
1.178 (eigenvalue for Factor 4) to 2.934 (eigenvalue for Factor 1) while the eigenvalue 
of the fifth factor is 0.711, which shows that four-factor solution is most appropriate in 
this analysis.   
Table 4. Rotated Factor Matrix 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Hierarchism item 1 0.06 0.26 0.10 0.64 
Hierarchism item 2 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.83 
Hierarchism item 3 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.78 
Egalitarianism item 1 0.31 -0.26 0.74 0.17 
Egalitarianism item 2 0.03 0.10 0.84 0.03 
Egalitarianism item 3 0.30 -0.24 0.73 0.07 
Individualism item 1 0.05 0.79 -0.14 0.15 
Individualism item 2 0.05 0.77 0.06 0.16 
Individualism item 3 0.07 0.70 -0.15 0.08 
Fatalism item 1 0.84 0.11 0.16 0.04 
Fatalism item 2 0.68 0.03 0.15 0.22 
Fatalism item 3 0.83 0.07 0.14 0.05 
       Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
SS loadings 2.11 1.95 1.91 1.85 
Proportion Var. 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Cumulative Var. 0.18 0.34 0.50 0.65 
 Note: factor loadings greater than 0.6 are presented in a bold font. 
Establishing two important tenants of a good measure, reliability and validity, 
some descriptive statistics of cultural orientation index (generated by taking a mean of 
related three cultural orientation measures for each of the four cultural types as 
discussed earlier) are examined.  As presented in Table 5, no apparent statistical 
problems in distributional characteristics of these cultural orientation indices are found.  
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Generally, respondents’ fatalist tendency is weaker than other cultural affinities by a 
very small margin.  Among the remaining three cultural orientations, individuals’ 
hierarchism and individualism is slightly stronger than their egalitarianism. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Cultural orientation index n Mean S.D. Median Min Max 
Hierarchism 1684 4.36 1.30 4.33 1 7 
Egalitarianism 1691 4.16 1.47 4.00 1 7 
Individualism 1691 4.42 1.27 4.33 1 7 
Fatalism 1693 3.72 1.39 3.67 1 7 
 
2.2.3. Results 
Table 6 presents how many individuals’ cultural types are predicted correctly when the 
conventional cultural type identification approach is employed.  As discussed earlier, I 
compared four cultural orientation indices (hierarchism index, egalitarianism index, 
individualism index, and fatalism index as explained in Table 3) for each individual 
respondent, and assigned each person a dominant cultural type when he or she scored 
highest on that cultural orientation index among the four.  After implementing listwise 
deletion of missing values in the data matrix used for this analysis, a total of 1,236 valid 
responses were recognized.  Overall, when employing this conventional approach, out 
of these 1,236 individual respondents, 478 (38.9%) individuals’ cultural types were 
predicted correctly.  More specifically, there are 263 respondents who self-identified as 
hierarchs.  Out of these 263 hierarchs, 100 (38.0%) individuals were correctly predicted 
as hierarchs when this conventional method was used.  Similarly, 102 (44.9%) out of 
227 self-identified egalitarians were predicted correctly, 236 (44.2%) out of 534 actual 
individualists, and 40 (18.9%) out of 212 actual fatalists, were predicted correctly. 
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Table 6. Cultural Type Predicted Using Conventional Method 
 
Actual cultural type 
Hierarch Egalitarian Individualist Fatalist 
Predicted 
cultural 
type 
Hierarch 100(38.0) 64(28.2) 135(25.3) 54(25.5) 
Egalitarian 73(27.8) 102(44.9) 121(22.7) 61(28.8) 
Individualist 74(28.1) 39(17.2) 236(44.2) 57(27.9) 
Fatalist 16(6.1) 22(9.7) 42(7.9) 40(18.9) 
Total 263(100) 227(100) 534(100) 212(100) 
Total number correct 478 
Total percent correct 38.9% 
Note: numbers represent frequency and numbers in parentheses shows column 
percentage. 
 
Another way to predict individual respondents’ cultural type is to utilize 
classification functions extracted from linear discriminant analysis, in which the 
aforementioned four cultural indices are used as predictors of individuals’ cultural type.  
Following this approach, I estimated a classification equation3 representing the 
relationship between predictor variables (four cultural orientation indices) and a 
particular cultural type.  This resulted in four classification equations corresponding to 
four cultural types.  Then, I inserted an individual respondent’s four cultural orientation 
indices into each of these classification equations to calculate an individual’s 
classification score for each cultural type.  I determined each individual’s cultural type 
for which she or he holds the highest classification score.  Table 7 presents the results 
acquired from employing this approach of cultural type identification.  Overall, 673 
(43%) out of 1,565 total valid survey respondents’ cultural types were predicted 
correctly.  Out of 637 self-identified individualists, 539 (84.6 %) were predicted 
correctly, which is better than any other cultural type both in terms of number and 
                                                
3 The functional form of classification equation for jth cultural type (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) is 
Cj = cj0 + cj1X1 + cj2X2 + cj3X3 + cj4X4, where Cj is a score on the classification function for 
cultural type j, cj is a classification function coefficient for cultural type j, and X is each cultural 
orientation index. 
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proportion in this analysis.  For the remaining cultural types, 40 (11.2%) out of 356 
actual hierarchs were predicted correctly, 72 (25.1%) out of 287 egalitarians, and 22 
(7.7%) out of 285 actual fatalists, respectively.        
Table 7. Cultural Type Predicted Using Discriminant Analysis 
 
Actual cultural type 
Hierarch Egalitarian Individualist Fatalist 
Predicted 
cultural 
type 
Hierarch 40(11.2) 31(10.8) 31(4.9) 25(8.8) 
Egalitarian 56(15.7) 72(25.1) 46(7.2)    47(16.5) 
Individualist 249(70.0) 165(57.5) 539(84.6) 191(67.0) 
Fatalist 11(3.1) 19(6.6) 21(3.3) 22(7.7) 
Total 356(100) 287(100) 637(100) 285(100) 
Total number correct 673 
Total percent correct 43.0% 
Note: numbers represent frequency and numbers in parentheses shows column 
percentage. 
 
 As shown in Table 8, when comparing the two approaches previously discussed, 
the proposed approach (based upon discriminant analysis) outperformed the 
conventional approach in terms of total number of correctly predicted cultural types and 
the overall proportion of correctly predicted vs. actual cultural types.  These results, 
however, are attributed mostly to the fact that the proposed approach is better than the 
conventional approach in identifying individualists to a great degree.  The proposed 
approach predicted 539 (or 84.6%) individualists (out of 627 actual individualists) 
correctly while the conventional method predicted only 236 (or 44.2%) individualists 
correctly.  As for the other remaining cultural types, the conventional approach 
generally performed better than the proposed approaches both in terms of actual number 
of correctly predicted cultural types and the percentage of them vs. actual cultural types.  
Noteworthy is the differences between these two approaches in terms of overall number 
of valid responses.  When applying the conventional approach, responses from 
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individuals who assigned the highest score to more than two cultural orientation indices 
at the same time were dropped off from the analysis because their cultural type is 
inconclusive.  
Table 8. Comparisons of Different Approaches 
                          
Approach 
Cultural type 
 
Conventional approach 
 
Proposed approach 
Hierarch 100/263 (38.0) 
40/356 
(11.2) 
Egalitarian 102/227 (44.9) 
72/287 
(25.1) 
Individualist 236/534 (44.2) 
539/637 
(84.6) 
Fatalist 40/212 (18.9) 
22/285 
(7.7) 
Overall 478/1236 (38.9) 
673/1565 
(43.0) 
     Note: numbers read ‘frequency of correctly predicted cultural type’/‘frequency  
     of actual cultural type.’  Numbers in parentheses show percentile proportion of  
    ‘correctly predicted cultural type’ to ‘actual cultural type’. 
  
2.3. Summary 
This chapter introduces Douglas and Wildavsky’s grid-group cultural theory, that 
essentially claims that individuals’ intrinsic values and beliefs about preferred social 
organization and ordering influence their conceptions of benefits and risks and their 
attitudes towards policies and related behaviors.  Acknowledging methodological 
shortcomings in the way in which theoretical cultural types (suggested in cultural theory) 
are operationalized in previous empirical studies, this chapter also seeks to assess and 
compare the conventional and new approaches for identifying individuals’ cultural type 
through systemic analysis of original survey data collected in 2011.  Theoretical claims 
suggested by cultural theory and proposed methods of individuals’ cultural type 
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identification relying on discriminant analysis will be greatly utilized in the discussion 
in the following chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) of this dissertation research.  
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Chapter 3. Public Perceptions of Benefits and Risks of Childhood Vaccinations 
When we visualize an individual’s expected utility regarding childhood vaccination, 
two major dimensions should be considered: perceived benefits and perceived risks. 
Theoretically speaking, when a person expects greater benefits, fewer risks, and that 
overall, benefits will outweigh risks, he or she will have a high expected utility for 
vaccinations, whereas in the opposite scenario, the person will hold a low expected 
utility (Weber, Blais and Betz, 2002).  Benefits and risks can be considered both at the 
collective and the individual level.  From the public health perspective, expected 
benefits of vaccination include foremost the avoidance of an epidemic of preventable 
diseases.  At the individual level, vaccinations benefit an infant or child with a healthier 
life by minimizing the risk of contracting such dangerous illnesses.  For individuals, 
vaccines’ risk lies in the possibility of grave side effects, while the collective wellbeing 
is threatened by the prospect that any given individual may suffer adverse reactions 
from mandatory childhood vaccinations.  Individuals’ expected utility of vaccination, 
however, naturally varies because of the considerable disparities in individuals’ 
perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks.  What accounts for such disparities? Major 
theoretical developments of benefit-risk perception in the past several decades4 have 
shown that when an individual is unsure of the probability of certain consequences for a 
particular event, his or her benefit-risk assessment can be influenced by a number of 
factors including (a) technical estimation of “real” risk (e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1978; 
Winterfeldt, John, and Borcherding, 1981), (b) cognitive heuristics and biases (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), (c) psychometric characteristics 
of risk (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987) and (d) values and beliefs, notably cultural 
                                                
4 For a good empirical review of risk perception theories, see Slovic et al. (2000). 
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worldview (Douglas and Wildvsky 1982).  Disparities within public benefit-risk 
perception on childhood vaccinations can be explained through these theoretical 
references.  The primary concern in this chapter, however, is to examine how cultural 
worldview, a core value centered in an individual’s belief system, impinges upon his or 
her comprehension of those benefits and risks related with vaccines. 
3.1. Cultural Theory of Risk Perception   
Cultural theory of risk perception posits that people form conceptions of societal danger 
in ways that will sustain their preferred “way of life” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
The more a particular event threatens their ideal social ordering, the higher the level of 
risk people perceive from it, while the more it supports their way of life, the lower the 
level of risk they perceive5 (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2009; Jenkins-Smith and  
Smith, 1994; Kahan et al., 2010; Lodge, Wegrich and McElroy, 2010; Silva and 
Jenkins-Smith, 2007; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990).  Cultural theory posits 
two fundamental theoretical dimensions of sociality that are woven into social 
interactions: group and grid.  The Group dimension represents the degree to which an 
individual’s social relations are determined by “bounded units” or group identity, while 
grid denotes the extent to which an individual’s social interactions are governed by 
                                                
5 There are an increasing number of approaches to cultural theory of risk perception.  For 
instance, a group of scholars at the University of Oklahoma, lead by Hank Jenkins-Smith and 
Carol Silva, follows most closely with the original work of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and 
Wildavksy and Dake (1990), in which individual-level indicators of cultural orientation, as a 
core value of the individual belief system, are measured and used to predict risk perceptions, 
policy preferences and behaviors in various risk domains (e.g., Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2009; 
Silva and Jenkins-Smith, 2007; Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2011; Song, Jenkins-
Smith and Silva, 2011 etc.).  Another group of scholars from the Cultural Cognition Project at 
Yale University, headed by Dan Kahan, emphasizes the cognitive aspects of cultural orientation 
and focuses on how individuals’ cultural biases work as a set of heuristics in the processing of 
information and in the course of risk-related reasoning (e.g., Kahan and Braman, 2006; Kahan, 
Braman, Cohen, Gastil and Slovic., 2010; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, and Gastil et. al., 2008 etc.). 
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“externally imposed prescription,” such as rules, social coercion, or institutionalized 
authority (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990: 5).  Based on these two theoretical 
dimensions, four distinctive prototypes of cultural orientations (favoring disparate sets 
of desirable social relationships) are proposed: hierarchism, egalitarianism, 
individualism, and fatalism (Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; 
Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  
The hierarch orientation is grounded on an inclination for strong group 
attachment and numerous social rules that clearly define stratified roles within society, 
in the confidence that a strong central point of authority encourages a better off, more 
productive society through a clearly defined social division of labor based not on mass 
equality, but expertise and specialization (Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  Likewise, it is 
reasonable to infer that when it comes to vaccinations, people with strong hierarchical 
tendencies would be expected to perceive substantial societal and individual benefits, 
and very small (or even negligible) risks, since most experts are in clear support of 
vaccinations as the most effective way to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and 
concur that these benefits overwhelm any minor risks.  Accordingly, cultural theorists 
expect to find that the benefits of vaccines outweigh the risks to a greater degree in 
comparison with other cultural types.  Furthermore, since hierarchs are as a rule more 
group-oriented, their interest in the collective benefits of vaccines will also tip the scales 
against the perceived individual-level risks.  
Though those who hold strong egalitarian orientation also highly prize group 
identity and cohesion, they reject a stratified society controlled by institutions and rules 
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imposed by what they perceive as lofty expert opinion (Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis 
and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  Therefore, 
egalitarians’ grid orientation is weak.  Instead, their ideal societal structure would 
involve a network of generally equal social relationships with no infringing outside 
authority.  Because of egalitarians’ strong group orientation, individuals’ personal 
preferences regarding vaccinations would be given less weight than the concern for 
endangered public health caused by failure or refusal to vaccinate.  Therefore, strong 
egalitarians are expected to perceive higher levels of benefit for vaccinations and lower 
levels of risk, though to a lesser degree than hierarchs, because of their aversion to the 
imposition of expert opinion upon the wishes of a community.   
People who most identify with the individualist orientation have both weak 
group and grid orientations, preferring a society centered on unfettered, self-regulated 
social relationships and a more competitive environment where equality is rooted in the 
ideal of equal opportunity (not in unconditional equal outcome); everyone has the same 
chance at achieving personal accomplishment through individual merit and exertion 
(Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky 
and Dake, 1990).  They are prone to resist centralized, top-down authority and the 
imposition of expert opinion over individual preference.  However, not unlike 
egalitarians, they are often conflicted about the merits, and drawbacks, of vaccinations. 
Individualists are much more prone than hierarchs or egalitarians to assign lower levels 
of benefit to vaccinations and higher levels of risk because of their aversion towards 
experts, but they will still be concerned with experts’ opinions because of a fear that 
non-vaccinated individuals could force infectious diseases upon others; causing 
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another’s health to suffer because of personal irresponsibility or preference undermines 
their centerpiece principle of individual self-determination6.     
Finally, people who most strongly identify as fatalists possess weak group 
orientations, avoiding social involvement and its constraints while exhibiting strong 
grid orientation and submission to socially imposed distinctions and the decisions of 
higher authorities (Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 
1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  However, they perceive of life as a series of 
uncontrollable events, so of all cultural types, they are most likely to emphasize the 
risks of vaccinations over any benefits; becoming infected with a communicable disease 
is seen as an inevitable part of one’s destiny or fortune.  This discussion is summarized 
in Table 9.  
Table 9. Cultural Type and Perception of Benefits and Risks of Vaccination 
 
Perceived 
benefits to 
the society as 
a whole 
Perceived 
benefits to 
you and 
your family 
Perceived 
risks to the 
society as a 
whole 
Perceived 
risks to you 
and your 
family 
Perceived 
benefit/risk 
ratio 
Hierarch  High High Low Low High 
Egalitarian Moderately high 
Moderately 
high 
Moderately 
low 
Moderately 
low 
Moderately 
high 
Individualist Moderately low 
Moderately 
low 
Moderately 
high 
Moderately 
high 
Moderately 
low 
Fatalist Low Low High High Low 
 
 
 
                                                
6 The individualist concern is that personal choices not to vaccinate may result in an expensive 
externality (a spillover cost on others not privy to the decision).  This is one of the few 
justifications among free-market thinkers for interventions in private decision-making. 
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3.2. Technocratic Disposition, Organic Culture, Trust, and Demographics 
Though the focus of this discussion is on cultural theory, there are many competing 
(and complementary) theoretical traditions and hypotheses that can also be applied to 
explain benefit-risk perceptions of childhood vaccinations.  As both rival explanations 
to cultural theory and controls in the statistical models that follow, a subset of the most 
promising alternative hypotheses is incorporated.  
Among another components of a personal belief system that have a direct 
bearing upon the perception of vaccine benefits and risks is the “technocratic 
disposition” based upon scientific optimism (Silva and Jenkins-Smith, 2007).  This is 
the conviction that the development of science and technology within a framework of 
the pursuit of “scientific (objective and value-neutral) truth” will benefit society by 
contributing to the common welfare, including through the advancement of vaccines. 
Intrinsic to this framework is the assumption that scientific experts will act for the 
greater good and not for their own material interests.  Currently, the majority of experts 
assess vaccines’ benefits as outweighing their risks.  Therefore, those with a strong 
technocratic disposition will accept this judgment and consequently judge vaccinations 
as more beneficial than risky.  
The set of values often dubbed “organic culture” is another aspect of the 
personal belief systems that may impact one’s appraisal of the role of vaccinations in 
individual and public health (Ernst, 2001; Lehrke et al., 2001; Gellin, Maibach and 
Marcuse, 2000).  As a subculture of post-materialism7, this culture prioritizes personal 
                                                
7 Inglehart (1990: 66) posits that as a society’s socioeconomic environment changes –improves– 
over time, individuals’ value priorities shift from issues of physical sustenance and safety 
(materialism) to concerns related to quality of life (Post-materialism).  Recent profusion of 
environmentalism, for instance, can be explained by this values shift. 
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wellbeing over material advancement and rejects the more mechanistic and synthetic 
approach to medicine and agriculture based upon modernism, namely methodological 
individualism.  Instead, proponents of organic culture favor naturally created everyday 
products as well as treatments rooted in holistic and homeopathic approaches in the 
belief that the human body can heal itself.  Accordingly, those possessing strong 
organic culture will be prone to sense higher levels of risk and lower levels of the 
benefit for vaccinations.  
The personal level of trust in health care professionals such as doctors and 
nurses can also have a considerable impact on individual attitudes towards benefits and 
risks of vaccinations (Gust et al., 2004; McMurray, 2004; Flanagan-Klygis, Sharp and 
Frader, 2005).  Health care professionals play an important role in directly providing 
information on childhood vaccinations to the general public.  However, those who 
mistrust health care professionals are more likely to reject the information they provide 
or even purposefully adopt a directly opposing viewpoint.  Considering that the 
majority of health care professionals affirm the overwhelming benefits of vaccines for 
individual infants and children and for overall public health, those who mistrust them 
are more likely to believe that the risks are high and the benefits low, as a result of their 
suspicions. 
Demographic characteristics, including individuals’ levels of  “quality 
knowledge” or domestic composition (Meszaros et al., 1996; Asch et al., 1994), can 
also influence judgment regarding vaccinations.  Quality knowledge may be defined as 
that which is accumulated based upon the solid scientific findings of experts and which 
reflects a recognized consensus within the scientific community.  Considering that the 
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majority of experts, including pediatricians, have reached a strong consensus on the 
safety and effectiveness of vaccinations, those who possess higher levels of quality 
knowledge on vaccines are apt to see vaccination as more beneficial than dangerous. 
The risk (benefit) perception of parents of infants and young children who ought to be 
vaccinated would differ from that of people with no children or with adult children. 
Additionally, females may perceive higher levels of vaccine risk than do males because 
they are more risk-adverse within the male-dominated socioeconomic structure and 
possess biological differences that foster protective maternal instincts (Finucane, Slovic, 
Mertz, Flynn, et al. 2000; Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz, 1994; but see Palmer, 2003; Kahan 
et al., 2007). Other demographic characteristics such as age, race (Finucane, Slovic, 
Mertz, Flynn, et al. 2000; Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz, 1994; but see Palmer, 2003; Kahan 
et al., 2007), education, and income level also have an impact on benefit/risk 
assessment and act as a compounding factor with the other aforementioned 
characteristics (Timmermans et al., 2005).  Overall, highly educated, wealthier non-
Hispanic whites, for example, are more likely to have better access to quality 
knowledge, which may in turn lead them to perceive greater benefits from vaccinations 
in comparison with other groups (e.g., Baker et al. 2010; Luman et al. 2005; Smith and 
Stevenson 2008; Wooten, Luman and Baker 2007).  Older people are generally more 
risk averse (e.g., Matthews and Moran, 1986) and may focus on the risks of 
vaccinations over any benefits.  
While concentrating upon the role of cultural orientations in the formation of the 
general public’s benefit-risk perception of child vaccinations, this research utilizes these 
controls to test the various hypotheses drawn from competing theoretical explanations. 
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3.3. Data, Variables, and Measures 
3.3.1. Survey Data 
A nationwide Internet survey focused on public perceptions of vaccination risks and 
policy preferences was conducted in early February 2010.  Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI), 
of Fairfield Connecticut, recruited the web survey respondents.  SSI maintains a panel 
of approximately 400,000 willing Internet survey participants whose demographics are 
roughly proportional to national census characteristics.  The sample was randomly 
drawn from the 400,000 census balanced panel.  Each member of the sample received 
an email invitation to participate in the survey describing the general nature and subject 
matter of the study.  As an incentive to participate, each respondent who completed the 
survey received a five-dollar stipend and was entered into a drawing for a larger cash 
award.  A total of 1,213 respondents (who are adults, 18 years or older) voluntarily 
participated in the survey.  On average, the survey participants were slightly over 45 
years of age. Nearly 52% were female, 77% were non-Hispanic White, 45% had 
completed college, and their median annual household income fell between $40,000 and 
$50,000. Sixty-four percent of survey participants were parents; approximately half of 
those who were parents had children living at home.  The survey included over 100 
questions, requiring an average response time of 22 minutes.  The questions focused on 
issues regarding vaccination practices, perceived benefits and risks of vaccinations, 
preferences for government vaccination policies, and acquisition of health information 
from the Internet.  Each respondent also provided a range of background information 
such as age, education level, annual household income and gender.  The University 
Institutional Review Board approved the survey and overall research design for Human 
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Research Participant Protection.  All personal identifiers were eliminated from the data 
to protect the privacy of survey respondents. 
3.3.2. Variables and Measures 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression with robust standard errors is employed to test 
the hypotheses discussed above.  Dependent variables are related with individuals’ 
perceptions of both vaccines’ benefits and risks and the balance between them.  The 
primary independent variables of interest are the individual’s cultural worldviews, while 
control variables include individuals’ beliefs and values (technocratic disposition and 
organic culture), level of trust for health care professionals, and the demographic 
characteristics addressed previously.  
Table 10. Variables and Associated Models 
Dependent 
variable 
Perceived benefits 
Perceived benefits to the 
society as a whole Model 1 
Perceived benefits to you 
and your family Model 2 
Perceived risks 
Perceived risks to the 
society as a whole Model 3 
Perceived risks to you and 
your family Model 4 
Balance between benefits and risks Model 5 
Independent 
variable Cultural worldview 
Hierarchism 
Model 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 
Egalitarianism 
Fatalism 
Individualism 
Control 
variable 
Other beliefs and 
values 
Technocratic disposition 
Organic culture 
Trust 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Vaccine-related knowledge 
Parental status 
Age 
Gender 
Race 
Education 
Income 
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As shown in Table 11, perceived benefit and perceived risk at the individual and 
societal levels respectively, along with benefit-risk ratio, constitute the dependent 
variables.  The variables related with perceived benefits and risks are graded on an 11-
point scale; higher scores indicate that survey respondents perceive higher levels of 
benefits (or risks).  On a 7-point Likert-type scale, a rating of under 4 for the variable of 
benefit-risk ratio indicates that survey respondents perceive that risks outweigh benefits, 
while a rating of 4 indicates that benefits and risks are equal, and a score from 5 to 7 
indicates that benefits outweigh risks.  
Table 11. Dependent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Perceived benefits to 
the society as a whole 
How much benefit do you think vaccinations provide to 
society as a whole by reducing sickness and preventing 
the spread of infectious diseases? (0=Not at all beneficial 
to 10=Extremely beneficial) 
Perceived benefits to 
you and your family 
How much benefit do you think vaccinations bring to 
you and your family in preventing infectious disease? 
(0=Not at all beneficial to 10=Extremely beneficial) 
Perceived risks to the 
society as a whole 
How much risk from adverse health reactions do you 
think vaccinations pose to people and society as a 
whole? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
Perceived risks to you 
and your family 
How much risk from adverse health reactions do you 
think vaccinations pose to you and your family? (0=No 
risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
Balance between 
benefits and risks 
How do you rate the overall balance of the risks and 
benefits of required vaccinations for infants and children 
in the U.S.? (1=Risks far outweigh benefits to 4=Risks 
and benefits are equally balanced to 7=Benefits far 
outweigh risks) 
 
Hierarchism, egalitarianism, fatalism, and individualism, the four cultural 
dispositions rooted in cultural theory, are the primary independent variables.  Three 
cultural bias-related statements representing each disposition (for a total of twelve 
separate statements) were presented in random order within the survey.  On a 7-point  
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Table 12. Independent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Hierarchism 
The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and do 
what you are told to do. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Our society is in trouble because we don’t obey those in 
authority. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and 
swift punishment on those who break the rules. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Hierarchism index Index of above three items (α=0.63) 
 
Egalitarianism 
What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make 
the distribution of goods more equal. (1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Society works best if power is shared equally. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income 
between the rich and the poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Egalitarianism index Index of above three items (α=0.80) 
 
Fatalism 
Most of the important things that take place in life happen 
by random chance. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is 
largely determined by forces beyond our control. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Fatalism index Index of above three items (α=0.77) 
 
Individualism 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for 
society to let people succeed or fail on their own. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own 
way in the world. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Individualism index Index of above three items (α=0.70) 
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ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 7, respondents rated their level of agreement with each 
statement.  The index for each cultural bias is then calculated by taking the mean of 
each set of three representative statements.  The question wording of these cultural 
measures is provided in Table 12.  The indices were derived from previous research 
(Jenkins-Smith and Smith, 1994; Silva, Jenkins-Smith and Barke, 1997).  Factor 
analysis demonstrates that these indicators are loaded on four unique underlying 
conceptual dimensions, one for each cultural disposition.  Cronbach’s alpha scores for 
scale reliability for the three measures constituting each cultural index were all in the 
acceptable range, from 0.63 to 0.80. 
In order to more precisely evaluate the effects of the primary independent 
variables (i.e., cultural worldview) on the dependent variables, this analysis control the 
effect of other values and beliefs, trust of health care professionals, and demographic 
attributes.  To create an index of technocratic disposition, the survey measure 
respondents’ degree of agreement with five statements related to their trust for science 
in general and for dependence upon expert opinion for societal decision-making.  For 
each statement, responses are graded on a 7-point scale, with higher scores exhibiting 
higher trust levels.  The mean value of all five responses is then used as the technocratic 
disposition index.  Likewise, the survey measure respondents’ degree of agreement with 
three statements addressing organic culture and take a mean score for these three items 
as the organic culture index.  Level of trust for health care professionals is measured on 
an 11-point scale (from 0 to 10) with higher scores demonstrating greater trust.  Finally, 
this analysis controls demographic variables that could impact personal opinion on 
vaccinations.  In order to create an index representing individuals’ level of knowledge, 
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the survey posed six basic yes-no questions related to vaccine issues.  The number of 
correct answers per individual can range from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating 
greater knowledge.  Parental status categorizes those who have at least one child under 
age eighteen, who are parents but do not have any children under age eighteen, and 
those without children.  Respondents are coded 1 for male in gender and for non-
Hispanic white in race.  Levels of education and household income are measured on 7-
point and 21-point scales  
Table 13. Control Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Technocratic 
disposition 
Technically trained experts, not the public, should make 
decisions about the applications of advanced technologies in 
society, such as new mandatory vaccines, use of genetically 
engineered foods, or reliance on nuclear energy. (1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Technology can solve almost all of society’s problems. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
The scientific process is the only valid and reliable way to 
understand nature. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
Those who are better informed should have more influence 
in policy making. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Technical issues are so complex that most people cannot 
contribute to reasonable policy choices. (1=Strongly disagree 
to 7=Strongly agree) 
 Technocratic 
disposition index Index of above five items (α=0.74) 
 
Organic culture 
Man-made toxins are much more dangerous than those 
toxins found in nature. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
It is almost always better to try natural or homeopathic 
remedies first. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
In general, organic fruits and vegetables are healthier for you 
than non-organic ones. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
Organic culture 
index Index of above three items (α=0.64) 
 
36 
Trust 
How trustworthy is information about health issues from 
health care professionals? (0=Not at all trustworthy to 
10=Completely trustworthy) 
Vaccine-related 
knowledge 
Even with mandatory vaccine programs, infectious diseases 
including measles, whooping cough and chickenpox, still 
occur in small numbers in the United States. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Vaccines typically cause many harmful side effects, 
illnesses, and even death. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Infants have natural immunity for most infectious diseases. 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
Getting vaccinated will substantially reduce the likelihood of 
getting the disease, but it will not eliminate the chance of 
getting it completely. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Most health officials recommend that infants and children 
receive multiple vaccinations for different diseases at the 
same time. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Diseases had already begun to disappear before vaccines 
were introduced, because of better hygiene and sanitation. 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
Knowledge index Index of above six items (A total number of correct answers) 
 
Parent with children 
under 18 1=Parent who has at least one child under 18 
Parent with children 
over 18 1=Parent who does not have any children under 18 
Age Age on last birthday 
Gender 1=Male 
Race 1=White, Not Hispanic 
Education The highest level of education completed (1=Elementary or some high school to 7=Doctorate (of any type)) 
Income Total estimated annual income (1=0-$10,000 to 21=$200,000 or more) 
 
respectively, with higher scores indicating higher levels.  The question wording of the 
control items is shown in Table 13.  Cronbach’s alpha scores for five technocratic 
disposition items and for three organic culture items were 0.74 and 0.64, respectively. 
Table 14 displays the descriptive statistics.  No problematic areas are apparent in 
distribution, range, and central tendency measures.  The distribution of income variable 
is slightly right-skewed; however, this characteristic is not unusual.  In general, 
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respondents believe that vaccines provide great benefits, both for society and for their 
own families, and perceive relatively minor societal and personal risks.  Turning to the 
four cultural biases, respondents are less inclined towards fatalism than they are 
hierarchism, egalitarianism, and individualism.  Additionally, respondents possess a 
relatively high level of vaccine-related knowledge, moderate levels of technocratic 
disposition and organic culture, and relatively strong trust for advice given by health 
care professionals. 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min Max 
Perceived benefits to the society as a whole 1212 7.8 2.0 0 10 
Perceived benefits to you and your family 1194 7.5 2.3 0 10 
Perceived risks to the society as a whole 1206 4.6 2.5 0 10 
Perceived risks to you and your family 1209 4.1 2.6 0 10 
Balance between benefits and risks 1205 5.2 1.5 1 7 
Hierarchism index 1196 4.5 1.3 1 7 
Egalitarianism index 1199 4.2 1.6 1 7 
Individualism index 1195 4.4 1.3 1 7 
Fatalism index 1198 3.6 1.5 1 7 
Technocratic disposition index 1184 4.0 1.1 1 7 
Organic culture index 1196 4.5 1.3 1 7 
Trust 1196 7.2 2.0 0 10 
Knowledge index 1194 4.4 1.2 0 6 
Age 1212 45.2 15.8 18 88 
Education 1194 3.5 1.3 1 7 
Income 1198 6.1 4.3 1 21 
 
As shown in the following table (Table 15), the number of respondents who are 
parents of children under age eighteen is 318, while 388 have children over eighteen, 
comprising 31.7% and 32.3% respectively of total valid responses.  
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Table 15. Frequency Table 
Variable n Category 1 Category 2 
Parent with children over 18 1201 No (68.3%) 
Yes 
(31.7%) 
Parent with children under 18 1201 No (67.7%) 
Yes 
(32.3%) 
Gender 1201 Female (51.9%) 
Male 
(48.1%) 
Race 1207 Non-White (23.0%) 
White, Not Hispanic  
(77.0%) 
 
3.4. Empirical Findings 
OLS regression results with robust standard errors are displayed in the following table. 
The procedures for heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimation as suggested by 
White (1980) were applied to address the problem of the heteroskedastic error 
distribution in statistical inference based on the results acquired from the fitted 
regression models, and used the results to make adjustments to the standard errors of 
regression coefficients derived from the OLS estimation in order to improve the 
statistical inference.  
As presented in Table 16, even when controlling for the effects of other 
variables, cultural biases consistently influence benefit-risk perceptions of childhood 
vaccinations8.  As hypothesized, even after controlling for the impacts of individuals’ 
technocratic disposition, organic culture, trust, and demographic characteristics, the 
results show that a stronger hierarch orientation translates into perceptions of greater  
                                                
8 A series of nested F-tests was conducted to examine the marginal contribution of a group of 
cultural orientation variables (i.e., hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism) in 
explaining dependent variables in all models, considering that all other control variables (based 
on alternative theoretical claims) are already in the models and that they collectively explain the 
dependent variables with statistical significance.  These results showed that the marginal 
contribution of cultural orientation measures were statistically significant at the level of 
 p < 0.001 in all models. 
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Table 16. OLS Regression Results 
  Dependent variable 
 
Perceived 
benefits to 
the society 
as a whole 
Perceived 
benefits to 
you and 
your 
family 
Perceived 
risks to 
the society 
as a whole 
Perceived 
risks to 
you and 
your 
family 
Balance 
between 
benefits 
and risks 
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hierarchism 0.187*** 0.269*** 0.016*** -0.015*** 0.109*** 
 
  (0.052)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.072)  (0.039) 
Egalitarianism 0.103*** 0.079*** -0.097*** -0.024*** 0.066*** 
 
  (0.046)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.034) 
Individualism -0.051*** -0.109*** 0.098*** 0.177*** -0.059*** 
 
  (0.051)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.068)  (0.038) 
Fatalism -0.174*** -0.137*** 0.377*** 0.345*** -0.173*** 
   (0.049)  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.038) Technocratic disposition 0.279*** 0.369*** -0.140*** -0.258*** 0.297*** 
 
  (0.079)  (0.083)  (0.082)  (0.089)  (0.053) 
Organic culture -0.174*** -0.198*** 0.461*** 0.388*** -0.221*** 
 
  (0.053)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.036) 
Trust 0.254*** 0.228*** -0.144*** -0.082*** 0.141*** 
   (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.024) 
Knowledge 0.277*** 0.258*** -0.326*** -0.430*** 0.203*** 
 
  (0.050)  (0.061)  (0.064)  (0.066)  (0.035) 
Parent with children over 18  0.173*** 0.303*** 0.246*** 0.044*** 0.269*** 
(1=Yes)   (0.172)  (0.217)  (0.202)  (0.222)  (0.119) 
Parent with children under 18 0.328*** 0.432*** 0.136*** 0.304*** 0.029*** 
(1=Yes)   (0.137)  (0.162)  (0.168)  (0.181)  (0.101) 
Age 0.009*** 0.010*** -0.025*** -0.019*** 0.003*** 
 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Gender (1=Male) -0.212*** -0.209*** 0.008*** -0.002*** -0.112*** 
 
  (0.111)  (0.134)  (0.141)  (0.148)  (0.081) 
Race (1=White, not Hispanic) 0.111*** -0.143*** -0.237*** -0.241*** 0.015*** 
 
  (0.142)  (0.157)  (0.179)  (0.186)  (0.094) 
Education 0.134*** 0.194*** -0.044*** -0.031*** 0.049*** 
 
  (0.043)  (0.053)  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.036) 
Income 0.025*** 0.018*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 0.020*** 
 
  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.011) 
Intercept 2.876*** 2.298*** 5.536*** 5.074*** 2.785*** 
 
  (0.520)  (0.609)  (0.663)  (0.715)  (0.384) 
F 20.59***  15.52*** 20.66*** 17.71***  19.77*** 
Adjusted R2    0.22    0.17    0.22    0.19    0.21 
Degree of freedom   1039   1024   1034   1039   1037 
             *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)            
    
benefits from vaccinations for society and individuals (Model 1 and 2).  Furthermore, 
those with strong hierarchical culture are more likely to perceive vaccinations’ benefits 
to far outweigh their risks (Model 5).  Meanwhile, hierarchism does not have 
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statistically significant impacts on the perceptions of risks (Model 3 and 4).  Secondly, 
the egalitarian bias has a comparatively weaker and less reliable impact on benefit-risk 
perceptions, confirming this study’s earlier conjecture.  Strong egalitarians tend to 
perceive high levels of collective benefit and low levels of collective risk for 
vaccination (Model 1 and 3) and are prone to think that any risks from vaccination are 
overshadowed by the benefits  (Model 5).  The egalitarian bias, however, fails to 
explain individual-level benefit and risk of vaccination with any statistical significance  
 (Model 2 and 4).  Furthermore, the individualist cultural bias also has a modest and 
somewhat fickle impact upon respondents’ perceptions of vaccinations’ benefits and 
risks.  In general, strong individualists are likely to imagine low levels of individual 
benefit (Model 2) and high levels of risks regarding vaccinations (Model 3 and 4). 
Additionally, those who possess strong individualist orientation are less likely to believe 
that the benefits are generally greater than the risks (Model 5).  However, individualism 
is not associated with perceived vaccine benefits at the societal level (Model 1) with any 
statistical significance.  The fourth and final cultural bias, fatalism, represents the most 
cohesive influence on vaccination benefit-risk perception.  Archetypical fatalists tend to 
emphasize the risks (Model 3 and 4), downplay vaccine benefits (Model 1 and 2), and 
are overall less likely to think the benefits are greater than risks (Model 5).  
Of note are several effects brought about by the control variables.  In general, 
individuals’ value and belief systems, trust, and some demographic characteristics also 
influence perceptions of the benefits and the risks of vaccinations in a very consistent 
manner.  Individuals characterized by a strong technocratic disposition, weak organic 
culture, greater trust for health care professionals, and greater vaccine-related 
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knowledge perceive higher levels of benefits and lower levels of risks from vaccinations 
at both societal and individual level.  In addition, they are more prone to believe that the 
benefits are greater than the risks. 
The analysis now turns to a prediction of the distributions of perceived benefits 
and risks of vaccinations by prototypical cultural type.  Based upon the statistical 
simulation technique suggested by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg9 (2000), this research 
takes the following analytic steps to calculate predicted distribution of perceived 
vaccination benefits and risks.  First, OLS regression models are estimated using the 
sample from the previous regression analysis applied for the hypothesis test.  In this 
parsimonious model, the same dependent variables employed previously (i.e., perceived 
vaccine benefits and risks at both societal and individual levels and their tradeoff) were 
used, but just four cultural measures (i.e., hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism, 
and fatalism) served as explanatory variables.  This parsimonious model was utilized 
mainly because this analysis focuses on the predictions based on the estimated effects of 
primary explanatory variables (i.e., hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism and 
fatalism) on dependent variables (i.e., perceived benefits and risks of vaccinations) 
rather than on the hypothesis test.  Statistical verification of such effects was already 
accomplished through the previous regression analysis in which major control variables 
(derived from competing theoretical claims) were included.  Table 17 displays the 
results of this simpler regression analysis. 
                                                
9 Because of the finite nature of the sample, King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) argue that 
parameter estimates from a regression model (e.g., regression coefficients) fit to the sample can 
never be absolutely certain.  Many probable sets of parameters can be drawn from their 
posterior or sampling distribution to address this uncertainty more directly.  For a more 
effective representation of the original regression results, these simulated results can be 
displayed graphically or employed for further analysis. 
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Table 17. OLS Regression Results used for Posterior Simulation 
  Dependent variable 
 
Perceived 
benefits to 
the society 
as a whole 
Perceived 
benefits to 
you and 
your 
family 
Perceived 
risks to 
the society 
as a whole 
Perceived 
risks to 
you and 
your 
family 
Balance 
between 
benefits 
and risks 
Parameters Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Hierarchism 0.323*** 0.402*** -0.089*** -0.106*** 0.203*** 
 
  (0.052)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.038) 
Egalitarianism 0.125*** 0.098*** 0.032*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 
 
  (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.031) 
Individualism 0.002*** -0.055*** 0.099*** 0.177*** -0.011*** 
 
  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.061)  (0.035) 
Fatalism  -0.278*** -0.204*** 0.510*** 0.445*** -0.231*** 
   (0.045)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.058)  (0.033) Intercept 6.863*** 6.259*** 2.601*** 1.792*** 4.849*** 
 
  (0.278)  (0.328)  (0.341)  (0.358)  (0.205) 
F 17.77***   14.17*** 30.61*** 26.21***   16.77*** 
Adjusted R2    0.05    0.04    0.09    0.08    0.05 
Degree of freedom   1156   1139   1150   1154   1152 
      *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. (Standard errors in parentheses)     
Second, iterative simulation (1,000 times) suggested by Gelman and Hill10 (2007) based 
upon the estimated parameters and variance-covariance matrix of these parameters 
acquired from the first step of the analysis is utilized.  One thousand different vectors of 
estimated regression coefficients (including coefficient for intercept term) for each 
model were obtained using this iterative simulation.  Third, an individual respondent’s 
cultural type is identified using classification equation estimated from discriminant 
analysis of data collected from 2011 survey data, as suggested in Chapter 2.  This 
classification equation essentially explains the functional relationships between the four 
                                                
10 The following computational steps were taken for this posterior simulation (Gelman and Hill 
2007: 143): First, the vector ! of estimated parameters, the variance-covariance matrix of 
parameter estimates, !!, and the residual variance !! were computed by using classical 
regression of n observations on k predictors.  Second, random simulations of the coefficient 
vector ! and the residual standard deviation ! were conducted.  For each simulation draw, (a) 
this analysis simulated ! = ! (! − !)/!, where X is a random draw from the χ! distribution 
with ! − ! degrees of freedom and (b) given the random draw of !, this analysis simulated ! 
from a multivariate normal distribution with mean ! and variance matrix !!!!. 
43 
cultural orientation measures (i.e., cultural orientation indices) and self identified 
cultural type found in the 2011 survey sample and can be applied to identify cultural 
type of an individual when each individual’s cultural orientation measures are available.  
Lastly, in order to obtain a distribution of predicted perceived benefits and risks for the 
four respective cultural types, I entered the cultural measure values for each 
prototypical cultural type (determined in the previous step) into each of the 1,000 
different simulated regression equations. 
The results of the analysis explaining predicted perceived benefits and risks of 
vaccinations are displayed in Figure 2.  Representing the distribution of predicted  
perceived societal and individual benefits of vaccination are panels (a) and (b) 
respectively.  Panel (c) shows predicted perceived societal risk of vaccination and panel 
(d), individual risk. Hierarch is indicated by the solid black histogram, white outlined in 
dark gray represents egalitarian, white outlined in light gray represents individualist, 
and solid gray represents fatalist, as designated in the legend.  While the horizontal axis 
represents the degree of perceived benefits (or risks) of vaccination, the vertical axis of 
the histograms shows the density function of the distribution.  As shown in the panels of 
Figure 2, the greatest contrast in vaccine benefit- risk perception lies between hierarchs 
and fatalists (their histograms show no overlap in the distribution of predicted benefit-
risk perceptions).  In comparison with other cultural types, hierarchs, as predicted, 
egalitarians perceive greater vaccine benefits and fewer risks than do individualists, 
while their distributions of predicted perceptions of vaccine risks significantly overlap.  
Though there are the aforementioned differences among the different cultural types’ 
predicted perceptions of vaccine benefits, all cultural types’ measures plainly fall above 
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the midscale.  However, for predicted vaccine risk, fatalists rate either above or around 
the midscale for predicted vaccine risks, revealing a marked contrast in opinion (that 
vaccination can be dangerous) from other cultural types, indicating that it is the 
perception of risk rather than benefit that is fueling controversy within the societal 
vaccine dialogue, as people with different cultural orientations express clashing 
viewpoints on vaccine risk.  Furthermore, while people generally perceive the societal 
benefits of vaccination use as slightly greater than individual benefits, they likewise feel 
that the risk posed to individuals is greater than societal risk.  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of predicted perceptions of the balance between 
vaccination benefits and risks.  For all four cultural types, there is a clear perception of 
benefits as greater than risks (falling above the mid scale).  In reality, however, this 
does not mean that individuals of different cultural types will easily come to an 
agreement about the actual efficacy of vaccinations.  Hierarchs’ assessment of the 
benefit-risk ratio of vaccination is much greater than fatalists’ and this perceptual 
difference is the heart of the vaccine controversy. 
Figure 3. Predicted Balance between Vaccine Benefits and Risks by Cultural Type 
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3.5. Summary 
This chapter seeks to explain the variations in perceived benefits and risks of 
vaccinations among the general public.  As cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982) claims, the results of the analysis suggest that cultural predispositions 
significantly influence individuals’ perceptions pertaining to vaccine benefits and risks 
at both societal and individual levels.  Those with a strong hierarch orientation tend to 
envision greater benefits and lesser risk and conceive of a relatively high ratio of benefit 
to risk when compared to other cultural types.  By contrast, those with a strong fatalist 
tendency are inclined to emphasize risks and downplay benefits while conceiving of a 
low vaccination benefit-risk ratio.  Situated between hierarchs and fatalists, egalitarians 
are prone to perceive greater benefits, smaller risks and a higher benefit-risk ratio than 
individualists.  
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Chapter 4. Understanding Preferences For Childhood Vaccination Policy 
Acknowledging that public perception of vaccine benefits and risks can be understood 
as a sociopolitical surrogate for the justification of competing cultural dispositions 
aimed at desirable social relations among the members of society, this chapter proceeds 
to investigate whether average citizens have analogous patterns of rationalization when 
they are involved in vaccine policy debates.  This chapter elucidates how individuals’ 
deep core values concerning a desirable social ordering impact the formation of their 
preferences toward controversial vaccination policies and key related issues of 
governance.  
4.1. Cultural Theory of Policy Preference Formation 
From a neoinstitutionalist perspective, the most important factors influencing individual 
policy preference involve personal values and beliefs (Peters, 2005; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Wildavsky, 1987).  Because public policy is considered to be an 
institution designed to resolve a particular social problem, and because public policy 
based upon due process and social consensus is understood as a norm and rule that 
defines social relationships, one’s preference for a particular public policy is derived not 
from a simple benefit-cost calculation, but rather from individual evaluation of the 
nature of influence a given policy, rule, or norm has upon a preferred “way of life” (e.g., 
Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2009; Jenkins-Smith and Smith, 1994; Kahan et al., 2010; 
Lodge, Wegrich and McElroy, 2010; Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Silva and Jenkins-
Smith, 2007; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990).  Cultural theory seeks to 
characterize the scope and nature of preferred ways of life based on different 
orientations for social relationships based upon two dimensions: group and grid 
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(Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky 
and Dake, 1990).  Group refers to what degree individuals are incorporated into 
“bounded units” within a society and grid indicates to what degree individuals’ social 
relationships are determined by “externally imposed prescriptions” (Thompson, Ellis 
and Wildavsky, 1990: 5).  Based upon these two dimensions are four different types of 
cultural orientation: hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism.  
The hierarch orientation is rooted in a preference for strong group attachment 
and numerous social prescriptions that clearly define roles in society.  This cultural bias 
emphasizes authority in the belief that social division of labor based upon specialization 
and expertise (rather than upon equality among the members of society) contributes to 
the wellbeing of society as a whole (Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 
1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  Considering that most experts 
assert that vaccinations are the most effective way to improve public health through 
prevention of diseases and that the health risks when weighed against the benefits are 
negligible, it can be conjectured that those with strong hierarchical tendencies will favor 
a mandatory vaccination policy.  This policy preference is also attributed to the fact that 
the mandatory vaccination policy is characterized as government prescription 
emphasizing collective benefits over individual risk.  With the same reasoning, those 
with a strong hierarch bias will tend to reject the various exemption policies.  That is, 
hierarchs are expected to oppose such policies because they are seen to resist expert 
opinion, focus on individual concerns rather than societal benefits, and are based upon 
“exceptional” cases which encourage defection from the existing institutional order (of 
mandatory vaccination policy).  From the perspective of risk governance, which is 
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related to the broader framework of policy decision-making, group-oriented hierarchs 
will tend to believe that eradication and elimination of infectious diseases is the 
responsibility of the community and not of individuals.  Therefore, hierarchs will 
believe that the government, not children’s parents, should be the chief decision maker 
regarding childhood immunizations. 
The egalitarian orientation, like that of hierarchs, is based upon strong group 
affinities.  However, its grid orientation is weak; egalitarians do not desire social 
relationships depending upon stratified institutions or the rules imposed by expert 
“outsiders” (Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; 
Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).  That is, egalitarians prefer equal social relationships and 
dislike institutional infringement and authority imposed from outside the group.  A 
robust sense of group orientation makes egalitarians more concerned about societal risk 
posed by jeopardizing public health through decreased herd immunity than about 
infringement upon individuals’ choice not to be vaccinated.  Because they are most 
concerned with societal-level wellbeing, they will tend to support government-
mandated vaccination policies.  However, egalitarians are likely to support such policies 
to a lesser degree than hierarchs due to their aversion to coercion by concentrated 
authority based on expert (rather than community) consensus.  This cultural 
characteristic will also have an impact on various vaccine exemption policies; 
considering that exemption policies focus more on individual rather than collective 
benefits, like hierarchs, egalitarians will oppose them, but to a lesser degree, due to their 
skepticism concerning policies based on centralized institutional controls rather than 
community consensus.  Group-oriented egalitarians will be prone to think that the 
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elimination and eradication of infectious diseases is a societal, not an individual, 
responsibility.  Accordingly, they will tend to believe that the government, not parents, 
should be the ultimate decision makers with regard to immunization of children. 
However, egalitarians know that emphasizing the role of government in the 
immunization of children also means the institutionalization of mandatory vaccination, 
which lessens their level of agreement with this reinforcement of governmental 
authority in comparison with hierarchs. 
The individualist orientation can be characterized as having both weak group 
and grid orientations.  Individualists prefer laissez faire, contract-based social 
interactions based upon self-regulation and competitiveness rooted in equal opportunity 
(Douglas, 1970; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky 
and Dake, 1990).  They dislike authority, external prescription, and the idea of equity 
based on equal outcomes rather than individual merit and effort.  With respect to 
mandatory vaccine policies, individualists (like egalitarians) are likely to be conflicted. 
Individualists may tend to oppose mandatory vaccination policies because they rely on 
institutional prescription and coercion.  At the same time, individualists will be 
sympathetic with these policies because they do not want non-vaccinated individuals to 
impose disease on others against their will; contracting a contagious disease due to the 
negligence or choice of others violates individualists’ preferences for individual 
autonomy.  Nevertheless, individualists are likely to support vaccination exemptions 
because they oppose imposition of choice on private individuals by governments.  They 
will tend to believe that the elimination of infectious diseases is, in the end, an 
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individual problem.  Therefore, in their view, children’s parents should make the key 
decisions regarding their immunization, not the government.  
Based upon a weak group orientation coupled with a perception of capriciously 
imposed constraints, fatalists lean toward nonparticipation in social relationships and 
(where possible) seek to avoid the requirements imposed by society (Douglas, 1970; 
Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990). 
Fatalists perceive ubiquitous societal rules and distinctions, exhibiting strong grid 
orientation, while simultaneously perceiving life’s events as chiefly random and 
uncontrollable.  By implication, fatalists would tend to believe that becoming infected 
with communicable diseases is part of one’s destiny or luck, and therefore will be 
skeptical of the mandatory vaccine policies designed to prevent such diseases.  Given 
that life is largely governed by random events, fatalists are also likely to view the 
potential risks of vaccines as being as great as the benefits.  Because they are likely to 
be skeptical of vaccine benefits and concerned about the risks, they will tend to support 
various vaccination exemption policies that would free them from responsibility for 
vaccinating themselves and their children.  This type of cultural orientation will urge  
Table 18. Cultural Type and Preferences for Childhood Vaccination Policy  
  Mandatory vaccination 
Religious 
exemption 
Philosophical 
exemption 
Parent should 
decide? 
Hierarch Strongly support 
Strongly 
oppose 
Strongly 
oppose 
Strongly 
disagree 
Egalitarian Conflictingly support 
Conflictingly 
oppose 
Conflictingly 
oppose 
Conflictingly 
disagree 
Individualist Conflictingly oppose 
Conflictingly 
support 
Conflictingly 
support 
Conflictingly 
agree 
Fatalist Strongly oppose 
Strongly 
support 
Strongly 
support 
Strongly    
agree 
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people to think that efforts to eliminate infectious diseases are (at best) left to the 
individual, rather than depending on a (probably ineffectual) societal mandate.  For 
fatalists, parents, not the government, should be the chief decision makers regarding 
children’s vaccinations.  This discussion is summarized in Table 18.  
4.2. Organic Culture, Ideology, Religion, and Demographics 
Grid/group orientations are not expected to operate in isolation, and there are a number 
of competing (or complementary) conjectures regarding the sources of vaccine policy 
preferences.  This study includes a subset of those that are most promising, both as rival 
explanations to cultural theory and as controls in the models that follow.  The post-
materialistic “organic” subculture promotes personal wellbeing, favoring naturally 
based remedies and holistic, homeopathic treatments (in the belief that the human body 
can heal itself) over mechanized, mass-produced, and synthetically derived modern 
medicine based upon methodological individualism.  Therefore, strong adherents to 
organic culture are expected generally to dislike vaccinations (Ernst, 2001; Gellin, 
Maibach and Marcuse, 2000; Lehrke et al., 2001), oppose mandatory vaccinations, and 
support exemption policies, reducing the problem of dealing with infectious diseases to 
the individual (or local community) level and delegating parents as the chief decision 
makers for their children’s vaccinations.  Political ideologies are also expected to 
influence policy preferences over a wide range of policies (Fiorino, 1989; Rothman and 
Lichter, 1987; Plutzer, Maney and O’Connor, 1998).  Those who are politically 
conservative generally tend to dislike expansive government that infringes on individual 
liberties.  Therefore, with regard to vaccination policies, conservatives are more likely 
than liberals to oppose mandatory vaccine policy, which is based upon government 
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enforcement, and are also more prone to support various exemption policies and to 
believe that parents should decide whether their children should be given 
immunizations.  Beyond political ideologies, it is also expected that those for whom 
religion is very important in their personal lives will tend to oppose mandatory 
vaccination policies, support exemptions (especially those which are religiously or 
philosophically based) and believe that parents should be the sole decision makers for 
childhood vaccinations.  
Demographic characteristics, including vaccine related knowledge level and 
domestic composition, can also influence policy preferences regarding vaccinations. 
Considering the fact that the majority of scientists champion the effectiveness of 
vaccinations and have verified very few cases of severe adverse reactions, those who 
are more knowledgeable about the scientific consensus regarding vaccines are likely to 
support mandatory vaccination policy, oppose exemptions, and favor the government’s 
role in managing childhood vaccinations.  Domestic composition also helps form policy 
preference.  For instance, the benefit/risk perceptions (and therefore, policy preference) 
of parents of infants and young children who are the targets of mandatory vaccine 
programs may differ from those of people with no children or with adult children. 
Additionally, females, who tend to be more risk-adverse than men across a wide array 
of hazards, may generally perceive higher levels of vaccine risk than do males (Barke, 
Jenkins-Smith and Slovic, 1993).  Therefore, parents with infants or young children and 
females may be more likely to oppose mandatory vaccination policy, support 
exemptions, and prefer to make their own decisions regarding immunization of any 
children in their care.  Other demographic characteristics such as age, race, education, 
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and income level may also have an impact on vaccination policy preferences and 
interact with the other aforementioned characteristics (Timmermans et al., 2005).  Prior 
research has found that on average, highly educated, older, and wealthier non-Hispanic 
whites are more likely to be more knowledgeable, which may in turn lead them to 
support mandatory vaccination policy and to dislike exemptions (e.g., Baker et al., 2010; 
Luman et al., 2005; Smith and Stevenson, 2008; Wooten, Luman and Baker, 2007).  
Utilizing these rival explanations and controls, this research tests hypotheses 
drawn from a variety of theoretical explanations for policy preferences toward 
childhood vaccination policy and the factors that impinge upon the formation of such 
preferences.  However, the primary focus is on how the general public’s cultural biases 
shape their vaccination policy preferences.  
4.3. Data, Variables, and Measures 
4.3.1. Survey Data 
A February 2010 nationwide Internet survey involving respondents recruited by Survey 
Sampling International (SSI) was conducted to measure public perceptions of 
vaccination risks and policy preferences.  The sample for this study was drawn from 
SSI’s regular panel of approximately 400,000 Internet survey recruits (whose 
demographics reflect national census characteristics).  A total of 1,213 volunteers aged 
18 and older accepted an e-mail invitation describing the study, received five dollars in 
compensation, and were entered into a larger cash drawing.  Each respondent provided 
a range of background information including age, gender, education level, and 
household income, revealing that the average age of survey participants was slightly 
over 45. Nearly 52% of respondents were female, 77% were non-Hispanic whites, and 
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45% had a college degree.  Participants’ median annual household income was between 
$40,000 and $50,000.  Of the 64% of participants who were parents, roughly half had 
children living at home.  The survey encompassed over 100 questions focused on issues 
regarding vaccination practices, perceived benefits and risks of vaccinations, 
preferences for government vaccination policies, and acquisition of health information 
from the Internet, with an average response time of 22 minutes.  The University of 
Oklahoma Institutional Review Board approved the survey and overall research design 
for Human Research Participant Protection. 
4.3.2. Variables and Measures  
This study employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard  
Table 19. Variables and Associated Models 
Dependent 
variable 
Preference toward mandatory vaccination policy Model 1 
Preference toward religious exemption policy Model 2 
Preference toward philosophical exemption policy Model 3 
Parents, not government, as chief immunization 
decision makers Model 4 
Independent 
variable 
Cultural 
worldview 
Hierarchism 
Model 1, 2, 
3 and 4 
Egalitarianism 
Fatalism 
Individualism 
Control 
variable 
Beliefs and 
values 
Organic culture 
Political ideology 
Personal Importance of religious 
faith 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Vaccine-related knowledge 
Parent 
Age 
Gender 
Race 
Education 
Income 
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errors to test the hypotheses developed in previous sections of this paper.  The variables 
used in the model estimations are listed in Table 19. 
The major dependent variables are the preferences for the existing government 
vaccine policies: mandatory vaccine policy and religious and philosophical exemption 
policies.  For a given vaccination policy, each respondent’s preference is measured on a 
7-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).  In 
addition, dependent variables also include the general public’s preference for the 
intrinsic governance framework bearing on vaccine policies, such as whether parents or 
the government should make decisions about immunization of children.  The 
respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement (or disagreement) with the 
relevant statement on a 7-point ordinal measure ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).  The question wording used for measuring these policy preferences is 
shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Dependent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Preference toward mandatory 
vaccination policy 
How do you feel about vaccine requirements 
for school entry? (1=Strongly oppose to 
7=Strongly support) 
Preference toward religious 
exemption policy 
How do you feel about religious exemptions 
from vaccine requirements? (1=Strongly 
oppose to 7=Strongly support) 
Preference toward philosophical 
exemption policy 
How do you feel about exemptions from 
vaccine requirements based on the parents’ 
philosophy or beliefs? (1=Strongly oppose to 
7=Strongly support) 
Parents, not government, as chief 
immunization decision makers 
Parents, not the government, should make 
decisions about immunizing their children. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
   
The primary independent variables include the four cultural dispositions based upon 
cultural theory: hierarchism, egalitarianism, fatalism, and individualism.  Three cultural  
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bias-related survey questions were asked for each bias (provided in random order), for a 
Table 21. Independent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Hierarchism 
The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and do 
what you are told to do. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Our society is in trouble because we don’t obey those in 
authority. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and 
swift punishment on those who break the rules. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Hierarchism index Index of above three items (α=0.63) 
 
Egalitarianism 
What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the 
distribution of goods more equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income 
between the rich and the poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Egalitarianism index Index of above three items (α=0.80) 
 
Individualism 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for 
society to let people succeed or fail on their own. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own 
way in the world. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Individualism index Index of above three items (α=0.70) 
 
Fatalism 
Most of the important things that take place in life happen 
by random chance. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is 
largely determined by forces beyond our control. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Fatalism index Index of above three items (α=0.77) 
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total of twelve questions.  Respondents rated the degree of agreement with each 
statement on a 7-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 7.  The index for each cultural 
bias is calculated by taking the mean of each set of three related survey items.  The 
question wording of these variables is presented in Table 21.  The indices were based on 
prior research (Jenkins-Smith and Smith, 1994; Silva, Jenkins-Smith and Barke, 1997).  
Factor analysis of the indicators demonstrates that they load on four unique factors, one 
for each cultural disposition.  Alpha scalability scores for the three measures were all in 
the acceptable range, with scores from 0.63 to 0.80. 
Control and rival explanatory variables include other values and beliefs that 
have an impact on policy preference as described above.  To create an index of organic 
culture, the survey measures respondents’ degree of agreement with three relevant 
statements, grading their responses to each on a 7-point scale, with higher scores 
representing greater agreement.  The mean value of all three responses is then used as 
the organic culture index.11  Political ideology is measured on a 7-point scale (from 1 to 
7) with lower scores exhibiting stronger liberalism and higher scores demonstrating 
stronger conservatism.  Personal importance of religious faith was measured on an 11-
point ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that respondents 
consider religion more important in their lives.  In order to create an index that 
measures individuals’ knowledge levels regarding vaccinations, the survey posed six 
basic vaccine related yes-no questions.  Individuals are given one point for each correct 
answer and a final score from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating greater knowledge 
(as a higher number of the six questions was answered correctly).  Finally, this analysis  
                                                
11 The Alpha score for the organic culture scale is 0.64. 
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Table 22. Control Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Organic culture 
Man-made toxins are much more dangerous than those 
toxins found in nature. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
It is almost always better to try natural or homeopathic 
remedies first. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
In general, organic fruits and vegetables are healthier for 
you than non-organic ones. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Organic culture index Index of above three items (α=0.64) 
 
Political ideology 
Which of the following categories best describes your 
views? (1=Strongly liberal to 4=Middle of the road to 
7=Strongly conservative) 
Personal importance 
of religious faith 
How important is religious faith in your life? (0=Not at all 
important to 10=Extremely important) 
 
Vaccine-related 
knowledge 
Even with mandatory vaccine programs, infectious 
diseases including measles, whooping cough and 
chickenpox, still occur in small numbers in the United 
States. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Vaccines typically cause many harmful side effects, 
illnesses, and even death. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Infants have natural immunity for most infectious 
diseases. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Getting vaccinated will substantially reduce the likelihood 
of getting the disease, but it will not eliminate the chance 
of getting it completely. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Most health officials recommend that infants and children 
receive multiple vaccinations for different diseases at the 
same time. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Diseases had already begun to disappear before vaccines 
were introduced, because of better hygiene and sanitation. 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
Knowledge index Index of above six items (A total number of correct answers) 
 
Parent with children 
over 18 1=Parent who does not have any child under 18 
Parent with children 
under 18 1=Parent who has at least one child under 18 
Age Age on last birthday 
Gender 1=Male 
Race 1=White, Not Hispanic 
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Education The highest level of education completed (1=Elementary or some high school to 7=Doctorate (of any type)) 
Income Total estimated annual income (1=0-$10,000 to 21=$200,000 or more) 
 
controls demographic variables that could impact personal opinion on vaccination 
policies.  Parental status identifies parents of children under age eighteen, of children 
eighteen and older, and non-parents.  In the categories of gender and race, respondents 
are coded 1 for male and for non-Hispanic white.  Levels of education and household 
income are measured on 7-point and 21-point rising scales, respectively.  The question 
wordings for the control items are shown in Table 22. 
As shown in Table 23, distribution, range, and central tendency measures reveal 
no apparent statistical problems.  In general, respondents prefer mandatory vaccination  
Table 23. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  n Mean S.D. Min Max 
Preference toward mandatory vaccination policy 1203 5.5 1.6 1 7 
Preference toward religious exemption policy 1201 3.5 2 1 7 
Preference toward philosophical exemption policy 1205 3.3 1.9 1 7 
Parents as chief immunization decision makers 1208 4.4 1.9 1 7 
Hierarchism index 1196 4.5 1.3 1 7 
Egalitarianism index 1199 4.2 1.6 1 7 
Individualism index 1195 4.4 1.3 1 7 
Fatalism index 1198 3.6 1.5 1 7 
Organic culture index 1196 4.5 1.3 1 7 
Political ideology 1203 4.1 1.6 1 7 
Personal importance of religious faith 1209 6.5 3.4 0 10 
Knowledge index 1194 4.4 1.2 0 6 
Age 1212 45.2 15.8 18 88 
Education 1194 3.5 1.3 1 7 
Income 1198 6.1 4.3 1 21 
 
policy to various exemption policies.  When they were asked who should decide about 
immunizing children many people felt that parents rather than the government should 
have the final say.  In terms of cultural biases, respondents are more inclined toward 
61 
hierarchism, egalitarianism, and individualism than they are toward fatalism.  
Respondents exhibit a modest level of affinity with “organic culture” and a normal 
distribution over the range of political ideologies.  Overall, respondents indicate that 
religious faith is relatively important in their lives and possess moderately high levels of 
vaccine related knowledge as measured on the index.  The distribution of the income 
variable displays the typical characteristic of being skewed to the right.   
The frequencies of the categorical variables are shown in Table 24.  While 381 
participants (31.7% of total valid responses) are parents who do not have any child 
under eighteen, 388 participants (32.3% of total valid responses) are parents who have 
at least one child under eighteen.  
Table 24. Frequency Table 
Variable n Category 1 Category 2 
Parent with children over 18 1201 No (68.3%) 
Yes 
(31.7%) 
Parent with children under 18 1201 No (67.7%) 
Yes 
(32.3%) 
Gender 1201 Female (51.9%) 
Male 
(48.1%) 
Race 1207 Non-White (23.0%) 
White, Not Hispanic 
(77.0%) 
 
4.4. Empirical Findings 
Table 25 displays the OLS regression results with robust standard errors.  In order to 
tackle the problem of the heteroskedastic error distribution in statistical inference based 
on the results acquired from the fitted regression models, this analysis applied the 
procedures for heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimation suggested by White 
(1980) and used the results to make adjustments to the standard errors of regression  
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Table 25.  OLS Regression Results  
  Dependent variable 
 
Preference 
toward 
mandatory 
vaccinatio
n policy 
Preference 
toward 
religious 
exemption 
policy 
Preference 
toward 
philosophical 
exemption 
policy 
Parents, not 
government, 
as chief 
immunization 
decision 
makers 
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Hierarchism    0.272*** -0.238*** -0.258*** -0.209*** 
   (0.044)   (0.055)  (0.060)  (0.057) 
Egalitarianism 0.137*** -0.110*** -0.062*** -0.024*** 
   (0.039)   (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Individualism 0.034*** 0.162*** 0.205*** 0.253*** 
   (0.041)   (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.050) 
Fatalism -0.101*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 
   (0.038)   (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.048) 
Organic culture -0.166*** 0.234*** 0.236*** 0.185*** 
   (0.040)   (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Political ideology -0.070*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.100*** 
   (0.034)   (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Personal importance of 
religious faith 
0.005*** 0.135*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 
  (0.014)   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Knowledge 0.173*** -0.190*** -0.219*** -0.152*** 
   (0.040)   (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.046) 
Parent with children over 18 
(1=Yes) 
0.088*** -0.058*** -0.005*** 0.076*** 
  (0.133)   (0.171)  (0.160)  (0.168) 
Parent with children under 18 
(1=Yes) 
0.055*** -0.025*** 0.128*** 0.256*** 
  (0.115)   (0.140)  (0.139)  (0.134) 
Age 0.009*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.018*** 
   (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Gender (1=Male) -0.150*** -0.049*** -0.005*** 0.040*** 
   (0.090)   (0.113)  (0.111)  (0.109) 
Race (1=White, not Hispanic) -0.071*** 0.402*** 0.337*** 0.461*** 
   (0.117)   (0.141)  (0.139)  (0.134) 
Education 0.058*** 0.018*** -0.050*** -0.132*** 
   (0.035)   (0.048) (0.048)  (0.046) 
Income 0.018*** -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.003*** 
   (0.011)   (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Intercept 3.584*** 3.199*** 3.297*** 3.376*** 
   (0.430)   (0.533)  (0.535)  (0.545) 
F   10.01*** 15.48*** 15.94***        14.84*** 
Adjusted R2    0.112    0.169 0.173  0.162 
Degree of freedom    1054     1053 1056  1058 
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. (Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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coefficients derived from the OLS estimation in order to improve the statistical 
inference.  The results show that cultural biases systematically influence vaccine policy 
preferences even when controlling for the effects of other variables on the dependent 
variable.  First, as hypothesized earlier, those with strong hierarchical culture tend to 
support mandatory vaccine policy (Model 1), oppose various exemption policies 
(Model 2 and 3), and find that the government, not parents, should determine childhood 
vaccinations (Model 4).  Second, as conjectured, egalitarian bias has a comparatively 
weaker and less consistent impact on vaccine related policy preferences.  Those who 
have a strong egalitarian bias tend to support mandatory vaccine policy (Model 1) and 
oppose religious exemption policy (Model 2).  However, egalitarianism has no 
statistically significant impact on any other policy preferences (Model 3 and 4).  Third, 
the individualist cultural bias has an inconsistent impact on vaccination policy 
preferences.  Strong individualists are more likely to support various vaccine exemption 
policies (Model 2 and 3) and agree that parents, not the government, should decide on 
children’s vaccinations (Model 4).  However, individualism has no statistically 
significant impact on other policy preference (Model 1).  Finally, the fatalist bias 
exhibits a consistent influence on various vaccine-related policy preferences.  As 
expected, strong fatalists tend to oppose mandatory vaccination policies (Model 1), 
support various exemption policies (Model 2 and 3), and believe that parents should 
decide if their children are immunized (Model 4). 
The effects of several control variables on the policy preferences are 
noteworthy.  In general, those who are characterized by a strong organic culture, who 
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are politically conservative12, who hold strong religious beliefs13, or who are non-
Hispanic white, older, or who are less knowledgeable about immunizations are more 
reluctant to support mandatory vaccination policy (Model 1), tend to favor vaccine 
exemption policies (Model 2 and 3), believe that parents, not government, should 
chiefly decide about immunization of children (Model 4).    
The next analysis involves a prediction of the distributions of vaccine policy 
preferences according to prototypical cultural type utilizing the fitted regression model 
and technique of statistical simulations suggested by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 
(2000).  Based upon this approach, this research took the following analytic steps to 
acquire predicted distribution of various vaccine policy preferences for each of the four 
cultural types in this paper.  First, OLS regression models were fitted to the sample used 
for previous regression analysis for the hypothesis test.  This regression analysis used 
the same dependent variables employed in the previous models (i.e., preferences for 
various vaccination policies), but used only the four cultural measures (i.e., hierarchism, 
egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism) as explanatory variables. A simplified 
model mainly because the focus of this analysis does not lie in the hypothesis test 
(which was the focus of previous regression analysis) but in the predictions based on the 
estimated effects of primary independent variables (i.e., cultural measures) on 
dependent variables (i.e., vaccine policy preferences) which were statistically verified in 
the previous regression analysis that also contained control variables derived from other 
major competing theoretical claims.  In addition, hypothesis tests involved in previous 
regressions showed that many of the estimated regression coefficients for the control 
                                                
12 The effect of support for vaccine exemption policies based upon religion or philosophical 
belief is not statistically significant.  
13 Their propensity to support mandatory vaccination policy is not statistically significant.   
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variables are not statistically significantly different from zero, which was another reason 
to discard these variables in this regression analysis for the prediction.  The results of 
this regression analysis are shown in Table 26.  Second, based upon the estimated 
parameters and variance-covariance matrix14 of these parameters acquired from the first  
Table 26. OLS Regression Results used for Posterior Simulation 
 Dependent variable 
 
Preference 
toward 
mandatory 
vaccination 
policy 
Preference 
toward 
religious 
exemption 
policy 
Preference 
toward 
philosophical 
exemption 
policy 
Parents, not 
government, 
as chief 
immunization 
decision 
makers 
Parameters Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Hierarchism 0.264*** -0.174***       -0.210*** -0.141*** 
    (0.041)        (0.053)       (0.050)    (0.050) 
Egalitarianism   0.097*** -0.029***       0.011*** 0.010*** 
    (0.033)        (0.043)       (0.041)    (0.040) 
Individualism 0.015*** 0.166***       0.204*** 0.250*** 
    (0.037)        (0.048) (0.046)    (0.046) 
Fatalism -0.171*** 0.233***       0.266*** 0.229*** 
    (0.035)        (0.046) (0.044)    (0.043) 
Intercept 4.504*** 2.827***       2.395*** 3.098*** 
    (0.219)        (0.284) (0.271)    (0.268) 
F 16.85***        11.38***       17.94***      18.120*** 
Adjusted R2     0.052         0.035 0.055  0.056 
Degree of freedom     1149         1148 1151         1154 
  **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. (Standard errors in parentheses) 
step of the analysis, this analysis ran iterative simulation (1,000 times) suggested by 
Gelman and Hill (2007).  From this iterative simulation, 1,000 different vectors of 
estimated regression coefficients (including coefficient for intercept term) for each 
model were obtained.  Third, this analysis determined each individual’s cultural type by 
applying classification equation (estimated from discriminant analysis of 2011 survey 
                                                
14 This analysis uses variance-covariance matrix of estimated parameters derived from OLS 
regression rather than the one adjusted to heteroskedastic distribution of errors, which was used 
for statistical inference in the original multivariate model, because no heteroskedasticity 
problem was found in this simplified regression model. 
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data) to predict cultural type using individuals’ cultural orientation indices derived from 
2010 survey data, as proposed in Chapter 2.  As this classification equation basically 
explains how four cultural orientation measures predict each cultural type, we can 
predict cultural type of any sample when we have cultural orientation measures of that 
sample.  Finally, the cultural measure values for each prototypical cultural type 
determined in the previous step were entered in each of the 1,000 different simulated 
regression equations in order to obtain a distribution of predicted preferences for each 
of the four cultural types for the respective childhood vaccination policies. 
Figure 4 displays the results of this analysis highlighting the four most contested 
childhood vaccination policy issues.  Panel (a) shows distribution of predicted  
policy preferences for mandatory vaccinations, while panels (b), (c), and (d) show 
predicted policy preferences for religious exemption, philosophical exemption, and 
opinion on parental decision-making power regarding vaccinations, respectively.  As 
shown in the legend, the solid black histogram represents hierarch, white outlined in 
dark gray represents egalitarian, white outlined in light gray represents individualist, 
and solid gray represents fatalist.  The vertical axis of the histograms shows the density 
function of the distribution, while the horizontal axis represents either the degree of 
support for, or level of agreement with, the given policy issue.  Overall, the panels in 
Figure 4 reveal that hierarchs and fatalists are the two cultural types exhibiting the 
sharpest contrast in policy preference (histograms show no overlap in the distribution of 
predicted policy preferences for these two prototypes).  As expected, hierarchs are  
typically in support of mandatory vaccination, oppose religious and philosophical 
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exemption, and feel that government should preside over vaccination-related decisions. 
Fatalists strike a bold contrast in their opposition to mandatory vaccination policy and 
support for religious and philosophical exemptions.  In addition, they are much more 
likely to support the role of parents in deciding on vaccinations.  In general, the 
divergence in policy position between the two groups is driven by hierarchs, who are, 
for instance, clearly and strongly in support of mandatory vaccine policy, and oppose 
religious and philosophical exemptions, whereas fatalists neither strongly oppose (or 
support) mandatory vaccinations nor are in clear support of (or opposition to) 
exemptions based on religious and philosophical beliefs.  Instead, fatalists’ opinions on 
both issues tend to fall closer to the scale midpoint, reflecting both less support for 
mandatory vaccination positions and a less decisive position overall.  Falling between 
hierarchs and fatalists, egalitarian support for vaccinations is essentially stronger than 
individualists’, while the two exhibit notable overlap in their distribution of predicted 
preferences toward mandatory vaccination.  
4.5. Summary 
This chapter seeks to explain varying public opinions in the vaccine policy subsystem 
of the United States, where conflicting principles coexist within the same policy. 
Consistent with the argument of cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982), it is 
found that cultural biases have significant impacts on the formation of preferences 
toward vaccination policies.  Hierarchs and egalitarians are more likely to be pro-
vaccination, while individualists and (especially) fatalists tend to oppose this view. 
Hierarchs advocate mandatory vaccination, disapprove of religious and philosophical 
exemptions, and believe that government, not parents, should preside over childhood 
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immunizations.  By contrast, fatalists are inclined to negate mandatory vaccination 
policy and uphold religious and philosophical exemptions and the role of parents in 
determining vaccination of children.  Egalitarians’ pro-vaccination inclination is 
relatively weaker and less consistent than hierarchs’, while individualists’ anti-
vaccination leanings are overall less robust than those of fatalists. 
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Chapter 5. Parents’ Behavioral Decisions On Childhood Vaccinations 
Previous chapters have found that individuals’ morally based preferences for what they 
perceive as an ideal social order shape their benefit-risk perceptions regarding 
vaccinations and are reflected in their policy judgments.  The practical implications of 
such findings are manifold.  Government health authorities can utilize knowledge 
concerning the way individuals’ cultural orientations shape vaccine benefit-risk 
perception and policy preference to improve risk communication between the 
government, experts, and average people (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman. 2011). 
This goal is best carried out by adopting communication strategies based on identity 
confirmation (Cohen, Aronson and Steele, 2000), pluralistic advocacy (Earle and 
Cvetkovich, 1995), and narrative framing (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Shanahan, Jones 
and McBeth, 2011) and fostering “desirable” changes to public opinions on the issue.  
To pinpoint the practical limitations of these findings, we must first consider 
whether such “desirable” changes in general public attitude toward vaccine benefits and 
risks and related policies can actually directly translate into individual behavioral 
changes with regard to vaccinations.  Considerable previous research in public policy 
does not explicitly address the translation of such beliefs into behavior.  Instead, the 
focus remains on examining what shapes such beliefs (e.g., vaccine benefits and risks 
and policy preferences), with the assumption that those beliefs automatically translate 
into individuals’ behaviors.  Though this assumption is not incorrect, it does not provide 
much assistance in terms of the practical implications as to how an actual policy 
outcome can be realized through changes not only in individuals’ attitudes and thoughts, 
but also in their behavior.  This chapter focuses upon an empirical test of this very 
71 
assumption: In the context of childhood vaccination policy, how do individuals’ policy 
related beliefs (e.g., perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks and attitudes toward 
existing vaccine policies) actually translate into their behaviors, and what factors 
mediate such translations? 
5.1. Health Behavior Theories? 
Public health scholars have developed individual level health behavior theories for 
several decades.  Major theoretical models of individual health-related behavior, such as 
the Health Belief Model (HBM, Becker, 1974; Janz and Becker, 1984; Kirscht, 1988), 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT, Maddux and Rogers, 1983; Prentice-Dunn and 
Rogers, 1986; Rogers, 1983), Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT, Edwards, 
1954; Ronis, 1992; Sutton, 1982) and Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA, Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) address individuals’ behavior as motivated 
by their own reasoning, which in turn is composed mainly of two components: value 
and expectation (Weinstein 1993).  The theoretical root of this claim is the value-
expectancy theory (Fishbein, 1967; Fishbein, 1968).  Cognitive psychologists argue that 
individual behavior is a “function of the subjective value of an outcome and of the 
subjective probability, or expectation, that a particular action will achieve that outcome” 
(Champion and Skinner, 2008: 46).  The emphasis of this theoretical tradition lies in the 
influence of individuals’ mental processes (e.g., “thinking, reasoning, hypothesizing, 
and expecting” (Champion and Skinner, 2008: 46)) on their action; reinforcements are 
considered to operate by mediating expectations about the situation rather than having 
direct bearings on behavior.  When applied to the issue of public health, the 
aforementioned theoretical models of individual health related behavior generally 
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assume that “anticipation of a negative health outcome and the desire to avoid this 
outcome or reduce its impact creates motivation for self-protection” (Weinstein, 1993: 
324-325).  Individuals’ behaviors (their efforts to improve their own health) fall under 
the influence of the subjective value they assign to the “expected aversiveness” of the 
outcome (Weinstein, 1993: 325).  In the HBM and PMT, this is framed as perceived 
severity of health consequences, in SEUP as negative utility, and in the TRA as negative 
evaluation.  In all models, the impact of the perception of an adverse outcome on 
motivated behavior is in turn affected by its perceived probability, which is known as 
perceived vulnerability or perceived susceptibility in the HBM and PMT, subjective 
probability in SEUT, and as expectancy in the TRA.  If there is an expectation that a 
certain action can reduce “the likelihood or severity of harm,” then there is naturally 
also motivation to take that action.  Thus, expected benefit is the belief about the extent 
an action can actually mitigate the severity and likelihood of the undesirable health 
outcome. 
 How can we apply these theoretical configurations15 in explicating parents’ 
behaviors regarding childhood vaccinations?  When an individual parent perceives high 
levels of risk from disease infection (i.e., believes that the severity and probability of 
disease infection is high), he or she will be more motivated to have his or her children 
vaccinated, and the expected benefit from such a behavioral decision is the mitigation of 
the risk of disease infection (both in terms of severity and probability) posed to the child 
by taking such preventive measures.  The real focus of the discussion of this research, 
                                                
15 Certainly, such simplified descriptions do not fully encapsulate all the complexities of these 
theoretical models, but this study seeks a broader conceptual discussion than already found in 
the existing theoretical literature.  For a more detailed comparative review of the theories, see 
Weinstein (1993). 
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however, is how to address the risks derived from vaccination per se.  Vaccinating can 
be thought of as an action motivated by the belief that it can generate benefits, to the 
extent that it mitigates the risks posed by disease infection at the individual level and 
secures herd immunity at the collective level.  At the same time, we cannot ignore that 
such an action can also generate harmful consequences if side effects occur.  If we 
assume that all members of society equally perceive the same level of benefit from 
vaccination (i.e., benefits gained from avoiding potential disease infection), then the 
motivation of vaccine related behavior (and the force behind individual variation in that 
behavior) is dependent upon individuals’ perception of risk; when people perceive 
higher levels of (individual and societal) risks (in terms of severity and probability of 
vaccine side effects), then expected benefits derived from avoiding vaccinations 
strongly motivate them to “opt out” from vaccination for their own children.  
Meanwhile, if we assume that members of society all perceive roughly the same levels 
of risk from vaccinations, then perceived (individual and societal) benefits from 
vaccinations can influence individuals’ vaccination behavior as a motivation factor. 
Furthermore, parents’ mental comparison between these two important aspects of 
vaccinations (i.e., risks and benefits), not just an independent consideration of each 
dimension, will motivate vaccination-related behavior such that the more parents 
believe vaccine benefits outweigh the risks, the more likely they are to actually 
vaccinate their children. 
More importantly, most of the aforementioned individual level health related 
behavior theories have neglected the idea that “related policies” can function as 
institutional constraints on individual behaviors; this is not strange, however.  Not all 
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individual-level health related behaviors are actually constrained by government policy 
(e.g., consuming lots of sugary foods after an individual has been diagnosed with 
diabetes).  However, the TRA differs from other preceding models by explicitly 
incorporating social influence.  It does this by examining how much members of society 
desire to see an individual follow a shared set of social norms and mores by taking a 
particular action, and how much the individual feels compelled by their instructions. 
While this theory does not explicitly consider the importance of government policy in 
shaping individuals’ behavior, it provides some theoretical basis (particularly from a 
neoinstitutionalist perspective, which considers institutions as part of the norms and 
beliefs shared by members of a society (e.g., Peters, 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993; Wildavsky, 1987)) for directly scrutinizing the influence of government policy 
vis-à-vis individuals’ vaccination related behavioral decisions.  Public policy is often 
linked with the goals of social change, sharing the aim to resolve a particular social 
problem. Social change is possible only when accompanied by changes in individual 
behaviors (Coombs, 1980).  This does not necessarily mean that government policy 
dictates individuals’ behaviors, but it can function as an institutional constraint. 
Therefore, individual preferences (e.g., support or opposition) toward existing policies 
can be an important part of motivation, which sets the course for behavior.  In the case 
of childhood vaccination, the United States’ current policies (e.g., both mandatory 
policy and various exemptions) simultaneously allow for a variety of individual 
behaviors.  Under such an arrangement, it is plausible to argue that the degree to which 
vaccination policies (as institutional constraints) affect individual behavior depends on 
what preferences the same individual has toward such policies.  
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5.2. Analytical Framework and Hypotheses 
The proposed analytical framework of this research is presented in Figure 5.  As the 
previous theoretical arguments imply, parents’ behavior in relation to childhood 
vaccinations is motivated by subjective expected utility of vaccination and preferences 
towards existing government vaccine policy.  The parent’s and child’s demographic and  
Figure 5. Analytical Framework 
 
vaccination-related characteristics influence these dynamics both directly and indirectly. 
That is, such factors may have a direct impact on a parent’s behavioral decisions about 
vaccination, or indirectly impact them by impinging upon subjective expected utility 
and policy preferences, which in turn influence his or her behaviors.  
Parent’s  
Behavioral Decision 
on Child 
Vaccination  
Parent’s Subjective Expected 
Utility of Vaccination 
!Perceived societal benefit 
!Perceived individual benefit 
!Perceived societal risk 
!Perceived individual risk 
!Tradeoff between benefits &  
  risks 
Parent’s Beliefs on Childhood 
Vaccination Policies   
!Preference toward mandatory   
  vaccination 
!Preference toward religious   
  exemption 
!Preference toward   
  philosophical exemption  
!Preference toward parental  
  rights on child immunization 
Parent’s Characteristics 
Issue-specific characteristics 
!Perceived prevalence of  
  preventable diseases 
!Trust (health professionals) 
!Vaccine-related knowledge 
!Autism experience 
!Internet use 
General characteristics 
!Demographics (age/gender/ 
  race/education/income) 
Child’s Characteristics 
!Health insurance coverage  
  for child 
!Number of children   
  (siblings) in family 
!Child’s age 
MODIFYING FACTORS PARENT’S BELIEFS PARENT’S ACTION 
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 More specifically, subjective expected utility of vaccination explores the 
benefits and risks at both societal and individual levels, and their tradeoffs.  It is 
conjectured that when individual parents perceive greater benefits, low risks, and a high 
benefit-risk ratio, they will be more likely to take their children to receive all 
government recommended vaccinations.  Meanwhile, parents’ preferences (support or 
opposition) toward existing vaccination policies and related key issues of governance 
will influence their vaccination related behaviors.  It is expected that when parents 
strongly support mandatory vaccinations, clearly oppose religious and philosophical 
exemption policies, and believe that the government, not parents, should be the chief 
decision maker when it comes to childhood immunizations, they will be more likely to 
have their children vaccinated.   
 Other factors may also influence a parent’s behavioral decisions regarding his 
or her children, including individual demographic characteristics and the perceived 
prevalence of preventable diseases.  Parents who believe that the world has become 
“much safer” and healthier (less risky) in regards to the threat of certain preventable 
infectious diseases will be less likely to vaccinate their children (Calandrillo, 2004; 
Wolfe and Sharp, 2002).  Parents who distrust health care professionals (who are 
frequently tasked with the important role of transmitting vital public health information 
to the general public) will be strongly influenced by such misgivings when judging the 
benefits and risks of vaccinations (Gust et al., 2004; McMurray, 2004; Flanagan-Klygis, 
Sharp and Frader, 2005).  Perhaps not surprisingly, distrustful parents are less likely to 
support mandatory vaccination policy and vaccinate their own children.  This is likely 
because the majority of health care experts strongly advocate for the considerable 
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benefits of vaccinations for infants, children, and public health.  An individual 
assessment of the benefits and risks of vaccination and related policies can be 
influenced by his or her affect16 towards vaccines, and this can impact behavioral 
decisions regarding vaccinations.  The evolving controversy over a potential vaccine-
autism link provides a prime example.  A few members of the scientific community 
have published studies claiming that thimerosal, a preservative found in vaccines, can 
result in both neurological damage and autism in infants and children (e.g., Stratton, 
Gable and Shetty 2001; Wakefield et al. 1998; Wakefield and Montgomery 2000). 
However, the current consensus among most experts is that this claim is erroneous (e.g., 
Dales, Hammer and Smith 2001; Kaye, Melero-Montes and Jick 2001; Taylor et al. 
1999).  A recent federal vaccine court decision added fuel to the vaccine-autism link 
controversy when it was found that vaccines did not cause Hannah Polling’s autism, but 
that receiving vaccinations “resulted” in a grave reaction caused by an as-yet unknown 
mitochondrial disorder (Attkisson, 2010), after which the government compensated the 
Polling family with $1.5 million and $500,000 for each following year for the duration 
of the child’s lifetime. Along with absorbing controversial information, parents with 
family and friends who have autism or Asperger’s syndrome are more likely to view 
vaccines in a negative light.  Though any link between vaccines and autism is as yet 
unproven, such “false” information is quickly and easily disseminated through the 
Internet (Clements et al., 1999), particularly to frequent web users.  This in turn will 
serve to reinforce unfavorable notions about mandatory vaccinations and encourage a 
                                                
16 Slovic et al. (2004: 2-3) define affect as “the specific quality of “goodness” or “badness” (1) 
experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a positive or 
negative quality of a stimulus.”   For more details, see Finucane et al. (2000), Slovic et al. 
(2004), or Slovic et al. (2007). 
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like-minded parent to avoid vaccination for his or her child.  Since the great majority of 
scientists currently uphold vaccinations as a means of effective and safe disease 
prevention for infants and children, those who have absorbed more vaccine related 
knowledge from mainstream scientific sources are more likely to see vaccinations as 
beneficial and support government operated mandatory vaccination programs.  
Meanwhile, parents’ general demographic characteristics, such as age, race, 
gender, education, and income level also have an impact on an individual’s benefit-risk 
assessment of vaccinations and impinge upon the other previously mentioned factors 
(Timmermans et al., 2005).  Due in part to vestiges of male social and economic 
domination in the structure of contemporary society, and also to biological differences 
that foster more protective and cautious reactions overall, females are generally more 
likely than males to think that vaccinations are risky (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, et 
al. 2000; Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz, 1994; but see Palmer, 2003; Kahan et al., 2007). 
Non-Hispanic whites with both higher education and income levels are more privy to 
quality knowledge regarding vaccinations.  Therefore, this demographic group may be 
led to conclude that vaccinations are more beneficial than other groups would believe 
(e.g., Baker et al. 2010; Luman et al. 2005; Smith and Stevenson 2008; Wooten, Luman 
and Baker 2007).  Finally, as people often become more risk averse as they age, the 
elder members of the population may emphasize the risks of vaccinations over benefits. 
Demographic characteristics of a child, such as his or her age, whether the child 
is covered by health insurance, and how many siblings the child has, will also be 
examined as control variables.  One can expect that parents are more likely to vaccinate 
their child when the child is young, has health insurance, and has fewer siblings. 
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5.3. Data, Variables, and Methods 
5.3.1. Survey Data 
Data for this study comes from a nationwide Internet survey conducted in early 
February 2010, which examines public perceptions of vaccine risks and individual 
policy preferences. Participants were randomly selected and recruited via e-mail 
notification from the Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI) panel of roughly 400,000 volunteer 
online survey participants who reflect national census demographics, for a total number 
of 1,213 volunteers (all adults above age 18).  Each participant was awarded five dollars 
for completing the roughly 22-minute, 100 question survey and given a chance to win a 
cash prize drawing.  The average age of the survey participants was slightly over 45 
years, while 52% of them were female, 77% non-Hispanic white, and 45% had a 
college degree.  The median household income fell between $40,000 and $50,000. 
Approximately half of the 64% of survey respondents who indicated they were parents 
had small children at home.  It is upon this subsample of parents (who had at least one 
child under age 18), and their children, that this research is focused.  Participants 
answered a variety of questions centered on vaccine practices, perceived benefits and 
risks of vaccinations, preference for government vaccination policy, and personal 
experience with accessing vaccine related information on the Internet.  Additionally, 
each respondent provided basic personal demographic information, including age, 
gender, level of education, and household income.  The University Institutional Review 
Board approved the survey structure as part of Human Research Participant Protection.
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5.3.2. Variables and Measures 
As shown in Table 27, the dependent variable in this study is linked with whether, and 
how, the parent (survey respondent) vaccinated his or her child.  This is categorized 
where 0, 1, and 2 mean that a child received no, some, or all of the recommended 
vaccinations respectively.  
Table 27. Dependent Variable and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Vaccination 
To the best of your knowledge, have your children received all, 
some or none of the recommended vaccines? (0=Child received no 
vaccines; 1=Child received some vaccines; 2=Child received all 
vaccines) 
 
As presented in Table 28, the parent’s individual assessment of his or her 
perceived benefits and risks at both the societal and individual levels and of the benefit-
risk ratio for vaccinations make up the first five primary independent variables. 
Variables representing benefits and risks of vaccinations, respectively, are gauged on an 
11-point scale, with larger numbers representing higher levels of perceived benefit or 
risk.  To measure the perceived benefit-risk ratio for each parent (survey participant), a 
7-point ordinal scale is used, with a score under 4 indicating that a parent believes risks 
outweigh benefits, while a score of 4 stands for an equal balance between benefit and 
risk, and a score of 5 to 7 represents a parent who feels that benefits are greater than 
risks.  Other primary variables are individuals’ preferences for existing government 
vaccination policies (mandatory policies and religious and philosophical exemption 
policies).  For each policy, parents’ preferences are measured on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).  Additionally, these independent 
variables also incorporate questions designed to gauge all respondents’ opinions on the  
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Table 28. Primary Independent Variables and Measures 
      (a) Parent’s Subjective Expected Utility of Vaccination 
Variable Measure 
Perceived benefits to 
the society as a whole 
How much benefit do you think vaccinations provide to 
society as a whole by reducing sickness and preventing 
the spread of infectious diseases? (0=Not at all beneficial 
to 10=Extremely beneficial) 
Perceived benefits to 
you and your family 
How much benefit do you think vaccinations bring to you 
and your family in preventing infectious disease? (0=Not 
at all beneficial to 10=Extremely beneficial) 
Perceived risks to the 
society as a whole 
How much risk from adverse health reactions do you 
think vaccinations pose to people and society as a whole? 
(0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
Perceived risks to you 
and your family 
How much risk from adverse health reactions do you 
think vaccinations pose to you and your family? (0=No 
risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
Balance between 
benefits and risks 
How do you rate the overall balance of the risks and 
benefits of required vaccinations for infants and children 
in the U.S.? (1=Risks far outweigh benefits to 4=Risks 
and benefits are equally balanced to 7=Benefits far 
outweigh risks) 
 
(b) Vaccine Policy Preferences 
 
 Variable Measure 
Preference toward mandatory 
vaccination policy 
How do you feel about vaccine requirements for 
school entry? (1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly 
support) 
Preference toward religious 
exemption policy 
How do you feel about religious exemptions from 
vaccine requirements? (1=Strongly oppose to 
7=Strongly support) 
Preference toward 
philosophical exemption 
policy 
How do you feel about exemptions from vaccine 
requirements based on the parents’ philosophy or 
beliefs? (1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly 
support) 
Parents, not government, as 
chief immunization decision 
makers 
Parents, not the government, should make 
decisions about immunizing their children. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
 
ideal role of government in dealing with this issue.  For example, parents were asked 
about the degree to which they agree with a set of statements that the parents, not 
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government, should make decisions about the immunization of children.  Respondents 
rated each relevant statement on a 7-point scale, with 1 representing “strongly disagree” 
and 7 representing “strongly agree.” 
Control variables and measures are presented in Table 29.  Parents were asked 
about their perceptions of the prevalence of ten different infectious diseases: measles, 
smallpox, hepatitis B, mumps, pertussis (whooping cough), tuberculosis, H1N1 flu 
(swine flu), varicella (chickenpox), and influenza (seasonal flu).  For each disease, they 
rated -1, 0 and 1 if they believed the disease is occurring less frequently, about the same, 
and more frequently, respectively, than it did fifty years ago.  These scores were then 
summed up to generate an additive index representing each parent’s perceptions on 
current disease prevalence.  The results from the questions about disease prevalence 
make up the first control variable in this analysis.  As a second control variable, 
respondents had to measure their own level of trust for health care professionals on an 
11-point scale (from 0 to 10), with higher scores demonstrating greater trust.  Third, 
individuals’ vaccine-related knowledge was taken into account through the creation of a 
representative index based upon six basic yes-no questions about vaccinations.  An 
individual’s score could range from 0 to 6, depending upon the number of questions 
they answered correctly.  If a parent has a child, other family members, or friends who 
have been diagnosed with autism or Asperger’s syndrome, they were coded as 1, and 0 
if they did not.  A parent who responded that he or she uses the Internet several times a 
day was coded with 1, and with a 0 otherwise.  Male parents were coded 1 in gender, as 
were non- Hispanic whites in race.  Education level and household income were 
measured on 7-point and 21-point scales, respectively, with high scores indicating high  
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Table 29. Control Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Perceived prevalence 
of disease 
In your view, is measles occurring less frequently, about 
the same, or more frequently than it did 50 years ago?  
(-1=Less frequently; 0=About the same; 1=More 
frequently)   
In your view, is smallpox occurring less frequently, 
about the same, or more frequently than it did 50 years 
ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the same; 1=More 
frequently)   
In your view, is hepatitis B occurring less frequently, 
about the same, or more frequently than it did 50 years 
ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the same; 1=More 
frequently)   
In your view, is mumps occurring less frequently, about 
the same, or more frequently than it did 50 years ago?  
(-1=Less frequently; 0=About the same; 1=More 
frequently)   
In your view, is pertussis (Whooping Cough) occurring 
less frequently, about the same, or more frequently than 
it did 50 years ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the 
same; 1=More frequently)   
In your view, is tuberculosis occurring less frequently, 
about the same, or more frequently than it did 50 years 
ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the same; 1=More 
frequently)   
In your view, is H1N1 flu (swine flu) occurring less 
frequently, about the same, or more frequently than it 
did 50 years ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the 
same; 1=More frequently)   
In your view, is poliomyelitis (polio) occurring less 
frequently, about the same, or more frequently than it 
did 50 years ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the 
same; 1=More frequently)   
In your view, is varicella (chickenpox) occurring less 
frequently, about the same, or more frequently than it 
did 50 years ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the 
same; 1=More frequently)   
In your view, is influenza (seasonal flu) occurring less 
frequently, about the same, or more frequently than it 
did 50 years ago? (-1=Less frequently; 0=About the 
same; 1=More frequently)   
Perceived disease 
prevalence index Additive index of above ten items 
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Trust 
How trustworthy is information about health issues from 
health care professionals? (0=Not at all trustworthy to 
10=Completely trustworthy) 
Vaccine-related 
knowledge 
Even with mandatory vaccine programs, infectious 
diseases including measles, whooping cough and 
chickenpox, still occur in small numbers in the United 
States. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Vaccines typically cause many harmful side effects, 
illnesses, and even death. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Infants have natural immunity for most infectious 
diseases. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Getting vaccinated will substantially reduce the 
likelihood of getting the disease, but it will not eliminate 
the chance of getting it completely. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Most health officials recommend that infants and 
children receive multiple vaccinations for different 
diseases at the same time. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Diseases had already begun to disappear before vaccines 
were introduced, because of better hygiene and 
sanitation. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Knowledge index Index of above six items (A total number of correct answers) 
 
Experience with 
autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome 
Do you have family members or friends (or their 
children) that have been diagnosed with autism or with 
Asperger’s syndrome? (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Frequency of Web 
use 1=Several times almost every day 
Age Age in years 
Gender 1=Male 
Race 1=White, Not Hispanic 
Education 
The highest level of education completed 
(1=Elementary or some high school to 7=Doctorate (of 
any type)) 
Income Total estimated annual income (1=0-$10,000 to 21=$200,000 or more) 
Health insurance 
coverage for child 1=Yes 
Number of children 
(siblings) in family Number of children in a family 
Child’s age Child’s age in years 
 
levels of education and income.  Each child reported by the parent as not covered by 
health insurance was coded 0, and a 1 indicates an insured child.  The number of 
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children in a family and the age of each child were also included as control variables.  
In terms of distribution, range, and central tendency measures, no problematic 
areas are evident as presented in Table 30.  Though the distribution of income variable 
is slightly right-skewed, this is not an unusual phenomenon.  In general, the data shows 
that parents believe that vaccinations are beneficial both for society and personally (for 
their own children), and perceive few societal and individual risks.  As a group, parents 
prefer mandatory vaccination policies to any exemptions, but also feel that parents, not 
the government, should have control of their own child’s immunizations.  In terms of 
the prevalence of the ten listed infectious diseases, respondents felt that those diseases 
are less prevalent today than fifty years ago, while they exhibited a relatively high level 
of vaccine related knowledge.  The parents also demonstrated a robust level of trust in  
Table 30. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min Max 
Perceived benefits to society as a whole 731 8.02 1.87 0 10 
Perceived benefits to you and your family 721 7.78 2.15 0 10 
Perceived risks to society as a whole 731 5.04 2.51 0 10 
Perceived risks to you and your family 728 4.64 2.70 0 10 
Balance between benefits and risks 729 5.21 1.48 1 7 
Preference toward mandatory vaccination policy 729 5.51 1.61 1 7 
Preference toward religious exemption policy 718 3.85 2.08 1 7 
Preference toward philosophical exemption policy 727 3.71 2.04 1 7 
Parents as chief immunization decision makers 725 4.82 1.90 1 7 
Perceived prevalence of disease 695 -3.75 4.08 -10 10 
Trust 723 7.47 2.01 0 10 
Knowledge 722 4.35 1.26 1 6 
Age 731 37.24 9.29 19 75 
Income 721 6.91 4.61 1 21 
Education 724 3.63 1.38 1 7 
Number of children (siblings) in family 731 2.35 1.10 1 6 
Child’s age 713 9.10 5.16 0 27 
 
health care professionals’ opinions. The mean age of surveyed parents of minors was 
37.24, and 52% of children had parents who had a college degree.  The median family 
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income fell on the range between  $50,000 and $60,000.  Average number of children in 
a family was 2.35 and average child’s age was 9.1 years. 
As shown in Table 31, out of 696 valid responses, 18% of children had parents 
whose family members or friends (or their children) had been diagnosed with Autism or 
Asperger’s syndrome. Out of 729 valid responses, 73% of children had parents who use 
the Internet very frequently (several times almost every day), while out of 719 valid 
responses, 93% of children were reported to have health insurance coverage. About 59% 
(out of 729 valid responses) of children had a responding parent who was female, while 
72% (our of 728 valid responses) had a parent who was non-Hispanic white. 
Table 31. Frequency Table 
Variable n Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
Vaccination 718 No (6%) 
Some 
(18%) 
All 
(76 %) 
Experience with autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome 696 
No 
(82%) 
Yes 
(18%) NA 
Frequency of Web use 729 Low (27%) 
High 
(73%) NA 
Gender 729 Female (59%) 
Male 
(41%) NA 
Race 728 Non-White (28%) 
White 
(72%) NA 
Health insurance coverage for child 719 No  (7%) 
Yes 
(93%) NA 
 
5.3.3. Methods 
The dependent variable is polytomous with three categories representing ordered 
progress toward full vaccination.  This variable is coded 0 when a child received no 
recommended vaccines, and 1 or 2 when a child received some or all recommended 
vaccines, respectively.  This analysis fits separate binary logistic regression models to 
each of a set of dichotomies derived from this trichotomy in order to calculate 
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unconditional fitted probability of each category of the dependent variable in response 
to changes in primary independent variables (e.g., parent’s subjective expected utility of 
vaccination and related policy preferences) (Fox, 2008; Greene 2002).  In doing so, the 
following steps are taken.  
First, the first set of binary partitions of the categories of aforementioned 
trichotomous dependent variable is generated and coded 0 when a child received no 
recommended vaccines and 1 when a child received any recommended vaccines (i.e., 
when a child received either some or all recommended vaccines).  Then, a binary 
logistic regression model is fitted to estimate the conditional probabilities of a child 
receiving any recommended vaccines corresponding to the changes in the primary 
explanatory variables.  Next, the second set of binary partitions of the second category 
(representing child receiving any recommended vaccines) of the dichotomous 
dependent variable acquired from the first step of analysis is produced and coded 0 
when a child received some recommended vaccines and 1 when a child received all 
recommended vaccines, while the first category (representing child receiving no 
recommended vaccines) is undefined.  Then, a logistic regression model is fitted to 
predict the conditional probabilities of a child receiving all recommended vaccines of 
this dichotomous dependent variable in response to changes in the primary independent 
variables.  Third, using the conditional fitted probabilities acquired from previous two 
analytic steps, the unconditional fitted probabilities of each category of the original 
trichotomous dependent variable are calculated.  In a given set of independent variables 
used in the model estimations, (a) the probability of child receiving all recommended 
vaccines is calculated by multiplying the conditional probability of child receiving any 
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recommended vaccines (acquired from the first analytical step) by the conditional 
probability of child receiving all recommended vaccines (acquired from the second 
analytical step), (b) the probability of child receiving some recommended vaccines is 
calculated by multiplying the conditional probability of child receiving any 
recommended vaccines (acquired from the first analytical step) by the conditional 
probability of child receiving all recommended vaccines (acquired from the second 
analytical step) subtracted from 1, and (c) the probability of child receiving no 
recommended vaccines is calculated by subtracting the probability of child receiving 
any recommended vaccines (acquired from the first analytical step) from 1. 
More precisely, let!! !! = !""  denote unconditional fitted probability of child i 
receiving all recommended vaccines, ! !! = !"#$ , unconditional fitted probability of 
child i receiving some recommended vaccines, and!! !! = !" , unconditional fitted 
probability of child i receiving no recommended vaccines, respectively, for ! =1, 2, 3,… ,!. Based on the logistic regression model fitted in the first step of analysis, !! = !!! + !!, where !!is an !!×!1 vector of estimated logits (the log of the odds 
ratio), ! is an !!×!! data matrix, !!is a !!×!1 vector of maximum likelihood estimates 
of the model parameters, and !!is an !!×!1 vector of residuals, the conditional fitted 
probability of child i receiving any recommended vaccines with a given set of 
independent variables is represented by ! !! = !"#|!! = !(!! = !"#$!or!!""|!!) =1/(1+ exp[−!!!!!]), where !!! is the ith row of the data matrix !.  Likewise, based on 
the logistic regression model fitted in the second step of analysis where the category 
representing child receiving no vaccine is treated as undefined, !! = !!! + !!, where !! 
is an !!×!1 vector of estimated logits, ! is an !!×!! data matrix, !! is a !!×!1 vector of 
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maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters, and !! is an !!×!1 vector of 
residuals, the conditional fitted probability of child i receiving all recommended 
vaccines with a given set of independent variables is given by ! !! = !""|!! = 1/(1+exp[−!′!!!]).  Because the nested dichotomies (derived from !) used in the first and 
the second analytic steps are independent17, ! !! = !"" = ! !! = !"#|!! ∙ ! !! =!""|!! , ! !! = !"#$ = ! !! = !"#|!! ∙ 1− ! !! = !""|!! , and ! !! = !" =1− ! !! = !""|!! .   
5.4. Empirical Findings 
As displayed in Table 32, logistic regression results show how parents’ subjective 
expected utility of vaccination influenced their behavioral decisions regarding whether  
                                                
17 Suppose !! is trichotomous variable, coded 0, 1, and 2 when the ith child (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) 
received no, some, or all recommended vaccines, respectively.  Suppose !!!, !!!, and !!! are 
dummy variables representing whether !! is 0, 1, and 2, respectively.  For instance, !!! = 1 
when !! = 0, and 0 otherwise.  Likewise, !!! = 1 when !! = 1, and 0 otherwise.  Let !!! denote 
a dummy variable generated for the first analytic step and coded 1 when !! = 1!!"!2, and 0 
when !! = 0.  Let !!!! indicate a dummy variable produced for the second analytic step and 
coded 1 when !! = 2 and 0 when !! = 1, while undefined when !! = 0.  
 
The probability distribution of !!! is given by 
        ! !!! = (!!! + !!!)!!! ∙ !!!!!!!! = (!!! + !!!)!!!!!!! ∙ !!!!!!                    (1) 
where !!" = ! !! = !  for ! = 0, 1, 2. 
 
The probability distribution of !!!! is given by 
                          ! !!!! = ! !!!! = 1 !!!! ∙ ! !!!! = 0 !!!!!!                                                  (2) !!!!!!!!!!!!!= ! !! = 2|!! ≠ 0 !!!! ∙ ! !! = 1|!! ≠ 0 !!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!!!!!= !!!!!!!!!! !!!! ∙ !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!        !!!!!!!!!!!!!= !!!!!!!!!! !!! ∙ !!!!!!!!!! !!!   
 
Multiplying Equation (1) by Equation (2) produces 
  ! !!! ∙ ! !!!! = !!!!!! ∙ !!!!!! ∙ !!!!!! = ! !!  
 
Thus, nested dichotomies derived from the trichotomous dependent variable used for the 
analysis are independent. 
 
90 
Table 32. Logistic Regression Results: Effect of Parents’ Subjective Expected 
Utility of Vaccination on the Likelihood of Their Child Receiving NO or ANY 
Recommended Vaccines 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
Vaccination (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Perceived benefits to society as a 
whole 
0.417***    -***    -***    -***    -*** 
 (0.111) 
    Perceived benefits to you and 
your family 
   -*** 0.208***    -***    -***    -*** 
 
 (0.095) 
   Perceived risks to society as a 
whole 
   -***    -*** -0.074*    -***    -*** 
  
 (0.093) 
  Perceived risks to you and your 
family 
   -***    -***    -*** -0.262***    -*** 
   
(0.086)  Balance between benefits and 
risks 
   -***    -***    -***    -*** 0.274*** 
    
 (0.141) 
Perceived prevalence of disease -0.092*** -0.085*** -0.102*** -0.073*** -0.094*** 
 (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.055) 
Trust 0.071*** 0.134*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.179*** 
  (0.112)  (0.110)  (0.101)  (0.104)  (0.104) Knowledge 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.119*** 0.037*** 0.120*** 
  (0.201)  (0.205)  (0.193)  (0.200)  (0.197) Experience with Autism or 
Asperger’s syndrome (1=Yes) 
2.484*** 2.280*** 2.537*** 2.732*** 2.367*** 
 (1.087)  (1.062)  (1.083)  (1.097)  (1.066) 
Frequency of Web use (1=High) 0.594*** 0.434*** 0.661*** 0.708*** 0.753*** 
 (0.484)  (0.495)  (0.478)  (0.479)  (0.468) 
Age 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.010*** 0.001*** 
  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.029) Gender (1=Male) -0.015*** -0.511*** -0.483*** -0.652*** -0.347*** 
  (0.464)  (0.466)  (0.434)  (0.457)  (0.440) Race (1=White, not Hispanic) 1.773*** 1.716*** 1.534*** 1.670*** 1.669*** 
  (0.490)  (0.490)  (0.455)  (0.467)  (0.470) Income -0.092*** -0.082*** -0.060*** -0.049*** -0.084*** 
  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.061) Education -0.063*** 0.040*** 0.003*** -0.022*** 0.025*** 
  (0.239)  (0.237)  (0.234)  (0.236)  (0.232) Health insurance coverage for 
child (1=Yes) 
2.029*** 2.136*** 1.985*** 2.070*** 1.913*** 
 (0.650)  (0.616)  (0.627)  (0.661)  (0.624) 
Number of children (siblings) in 
family 
-0.571*** -0.565*** -0.584*** -0.535*** -0.577*** 
 (0.190)  (0.193)  (0.186)  (0.193)  (0.191) 
Child’s age -0.043*** -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.024*** 
  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.047) 
Intercept -1.708*** -0.716*** 0.033*** 1.784*** -1.393*** 
  (1.585)  (1.578)  (1.561)  (1.711)  (1.534) Degree of freedom *. 596 *. 586 * .596 * .595  *.596 
Residual deviance  168.91  171.72  182.70  173.02  179.62 
AIC  198.91  201.72  212.70  203.02  209.62 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
they decided their child receive no recommended vaccines or any recommended 
vaccines.  As hypothesized earlier, other conditions being equal, those who perceive 
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vaccines as highly beneficial at both the societal and individual levels (Model 1 and 2), 
who feel that vaccines pose low levels of individual risk (Model 4), and who believe 
that vaccine benefits far outweigh risks (Model 5) are more likely to vaccinate their 
child with statistical significance.  However, parents’ perception of societal risks of 
vaccinations does not influence the likelihood of their own child’s vaccination with any 
statistical significance (Model 3).  The influence of control variables based on 
competing (and complementary) theoretical claims is noteworthy.  In all models, those 
who have family members or acquaintances who have been diagnosed with autism or 
Asperger’s syndrome, who are non-Hispanic white, have fewer children, and whose 
child or children are covered with health insurance, are more likely to decide that their 
child should receive some or all recommended vaccines. 
 In Table 33, logistic regression results show how parents’ subjective expected 
utility of vaccination influences their behavioral decisions regarding whether their child 
ultimately received some or all recommended vaccines.  As hypothesized earlier, other 
conditions being equal, those who perceive high levels of vaccine benefit at both the 
societal and individual levels (Model 6 and 7), who perceive low levels of individual 
risk (Model 9), and who believe that vaccines’ benefits far outweigh risks (Model 10) 
are more likely to vaccinate their child with statistical significance.  However, once 
more, parents’ perception of risk to society posed by vaccinations does not influence the 
likelihood of their own child’s vaccination with any statistical significance.  The 
influence of control variables based on competing (and complementary) theoretical 
claims is noteworthy.  Those who personally know someone diagnosed with autism or 
Asperger’s syndrome (Model 6-10), who are white (Model 6, 8, 9 and 10), and whose  
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Table 33. Logistic Regression Results: Effect of Parents’ Subjective Expected 
Utility of Vaccination on the Likelihood of Their Child Receiving SOME or ALL 
Recommended Vaccines 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
Vaccination (0=Some; 1=All) 
Parameters Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Perceived benefits to society as 
a whole 
0.306***    -***    -***    -***    -*** 
 (0.067) 
    Perceived benefits to you and 
your family 
   -*** 0.334***    -***    -***    -*** 
 
 (0.055) 
   Perceived risks to society as a 
whole 
   -***    -*** -0.063***    -***    -*** 
  
 (0.048) 
  Perceived risks to you and your 
family 
   -***    -***    -*** -0.120***    -*** 
   
 (0.049)  Balance between benefits and 
risks 
   -***    -***    -***    -*** 0.410*** 
    
 (0.079) 
Perceived prevalence of disease -0.033*** -0.045*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.031*** 
 (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Trust 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.075*** 
  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.062) Knowledge 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.147*** 0.077*** 0.123*** 
  (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.098)  (0.103)  (0.100) Experience with Autism or 
Asperger's syndrome (1=Yes) 
-0.782*** -0.718*** -0.724*** -0.730*** -0.769*** 
 (0.274)  (0.280)  (0.271)  (0.271)  (0.274) 
Frequency of Web use (1=High) -0.204*** -0.228*** -0.125*** -0.110*** -0.047*** 
 (0.284)  (0.290)  (0.278)  (0.279)  (0.283) 
Age 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016) Gender (1=Male) -0.342*** -0.371*** -0.377*** -0.384*** -0.418*** 
  (0.249)  (0.256)  (0.241)  (0.242)**  (0.247) Race (1=White, not Hispanic) -0.573*** -0.495*** -0.619*** -0.604*** -0.610*** 
 (0.304)  (0.313)  (0.294)  (0.297)  (0.303) 
Income -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.034) Education 0.121*** 0.140*** 0.167*** 0.173*** 0.114*** 
  (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.111)  (0.113)  (0.116) Health insurance coverage for 
child (1=Yes) 
0.912*** 0.688*** 0.947*** 0.952*** 0.861*** 
 (0.455)  (0.472)  (0.436)  (0.444)  (0.460) 
Number of children (siblings) in 
family 
0.127*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 
 (0.121)  (0.126)  (0.121)  (0.121)  (0.125) 
Child’s age 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 
  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
Intercept -2.973*** -2.957*** -1.409*** -0.905*** -3.222*** 
  (0.972)  (0.980)  (0.982)  (1.003)  (0.973) Degree of freedom * .561  * 554 *. 561 *. 560 *. 561 
Residual deviance  482.75  462.26  502.49  497.26  476.86 
AIC  512.75  492.26  532.49  527.26  506.86 
**p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. (Standard errors in parentheses) 
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child is covered by health insurance (Model 6, 8, 9 and 10) are more likely to have their 
child receive all recommended vaccines, compared with those who do not have any 
autism experience, are non-white, and whose children do not have healthcare coverage. 
Because the dichotomies derived from the original trichotomous dependent variable 
(related to childhood vaccination) are independent18, the results of model estimations 
for these dichotomies (presented in Table 32 and 33) can be combined for statistical 
inferences for the original trichotomous dependent variable.  The following analysis of 
the deviance table (Table 34) presents the combined (summed) results of corresponding 
likelihood ratio !! statistics across two analyses of deviance tables derived from the 
results of previous logit analyses shown in Table 32 and 33, and the results of likelihood 
ratio tests to examine the statistical significance of the effects of each independent 
variable on the aforementioned trichotomous dependent variable.  As hypothesized 
earlier, the effects of parents’ perceptions of societal and individual vaccine benefits 
(combined results from Models 1 and 6 and from Models 2 and 7), individual vaccine 
risk (combined results from Models 4 and 9), and balance between vaccine benefits and 
risks (combined results from Models 5 and 10) on their behavioral decisions regarding 
child vaccinations are all statistically significant.  However, parents’ perception of the 
societal-level risks of vaccinations does not reveal any statistically significant influence 
on their behavior regarding vaccinating their own children (combined results from 
Model 3 and 8).  Yet again, control variables demonstrate a notable influence.  Parents’ 
experience with autism or Asperger’s syndrome, their race, health insurance coverage 
                                                
18 See footnote 17 for a more detailed explanation. 
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of child, and number of children (siblings) in family are statistically significantly related 
to their behavior regarding child vaccinations in all combined model results. 
Table 34. Analysis of Deviance: Effect of Parents’ Subjective Expected Utility of 
Vaccination on the Likelihood of Their Child Receiving NO, SOME, or ALL 
Recommended Vaccines 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
Vaccination (0=None; 1=Some; 2=All) 
 Combined results from 
Parameters Model 1 and 6 
Model 2 
and 7 
Model 3 
and 8 
Model 4 
and 9 
Model 5 
and 10 
Perceived benefits to society as a whole 35.86*** -***   -*** -*** -*** 
Perceived benefits to you and your family -*** 43.77***   -*** -*** -*** 
Perceived risks to society as a whole -*** -*** 2.32*** -*** -*** 
Perceived risks to you and your family -*** -***   -*** 16.46*** -*** 
Balance between benefits and risks -*** -***   -*** -*** 31.04*** 
Perceived prevalence of disease 3.56*** 4.13*** 4.43*** 2.19*** 3.86*** 
Trust 1.45*** 2.44*** 9.08*** 10.03*** 4.37*** 
Knowledge 0.22*** 0.12*** 2.64*** 0.58*** 1.96*** 
Experience with Autism (1=Yes) 17.44*** 14.74*** 17.37*** 18.85*** 16.73*** 
Frequency of Web use (1=High) 2.01*** 1.39*** 2.07*** 2.29*** 2.57*** 
Age 0.96*** 0.82*** 1.01*** 1.04*** 1.30*** 
Gender (1=Male) 1.89*** 3.33*** 3.70*** 4.59*** 3.49*** 
Race (1=White, not Hispanic) 17.99*** 15.78*** 16.64*** 18.15*** 17.82*** 
Income 2.87*** 2.48*** 1.03*** 0.82*** 2.09*** 
Education 1.18*** 1.46*** 2.29*** 2.42*** 1.01*** 
Health insurance coverage for child (1=Yes) 12.83*** 13.20*** 13.69*** 13.24*** 12.25*** 
Number of children (siblings) in family 9.93*** 9.60*** 11.19*** 9.31*** 10.51*** 
Child’s age 2.33*** 2.05*** 1.32*** 1.43*** 1.56*** 
**p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. (Note: Numbers presented in the table are likelihood ratio !! statistics and the 
degrees of freedom for each variable in the likelihood test is 2.) 
 
These results are graphically presented in Figure 6. This figure demonstrates 
how parents’ perception of the benefit-risk ratio of vaccination influences their 
behavioral decisions with regard to vaccinating their children. The vertical axis 
represents predicted fitted probability of vaccination, while the horizontal axis shows 
parents’ perception of the balance between vaccination benefits and risks, on a 7 point 
rising scale from 1 (risks far outweigh benefits) to 7 (benefits far outweigh risks). The 
dashed line shows the probability that a parent’s child receives no recommended  
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Figure 6. Effect of Vaccine Benefit-Risk Perception on Predicted Probability of 
Vaccination 
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vaccines, the short dashed line, the probability a parent’s child receives some 
recommended vaccines, and the solid line represents the probability that a parent’s child 
receives all recommended vaccines.  Parents who strongly believe that vaccine benefits 
are far greater than the risks are more likely to have children who received all 
recommended vaccines and less likely to have children with some or no vaccines (first 
row).  The patterns of these relationships hold for parents who have different socio-
demographic characteristics, but in general, those without experience with autism 
(second row), who are non-white (third row), and whose child has health insurance 
coverage (fourth row) are more likely to have taken their children for all recommended 
vaccines, and less likely to decide that their child have some or no recommended 
vaccines in comparison with those who have autism experience, who are white, and 
whose child does not have health insurance coverage.  
In Table 35, the logistic regression results show how parents’ beliefs about 
childhood vaccination policies influence their behavioral decisions regarding whether 
their child receives no or any recommended vaccines.  As hypothesized earlier, ceteris 
peribus, those who support mandatory vaccinations (Model 11), oppose philosophical 
exemptions (Model 13), and disagree that parents (not government) should be the chief 
decision makers in immunizing children (Model 14) are more likely to vaccinate their 
child with statistical significance.  However, parents’ opinions on religious exemption 
policy do not influence the likelihood of their own child’s vaccination with statistical 
significance (Model 12).  Among the control variables that show the most consistent 
influence on the dependent variables are parent’s experience with autism and 
Asperger’s syndrome, race, health insurance coverage for child and the number of  
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Table 35. Logistic Regression Results: Effect of Parents’ Vaccine Policy Beliefs on 
the Likelihood of Their Child Receiving NO or ANY Recommended Vaccines 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
Vaccination (0=No; 1=Yes) 
Parameters Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Preference toward mandatory vaccination 
policy 
0.457***    -***    -***    -*** 
 (0.130)    Preference toward religious exemption 
policy 
   -*** -0.161***    -***    -*** 
    (0.125)   Preference toward philosophical 
exemption policy 
   -***    -*** -0.311***    -*** 
  (0.119)  Parents, not government, as chief 
immunization decision makers 
   -***    -***    -*** -0.296*** 
    (0.138) Perceived prevalence of disease -0.131*** -0.116*** -0.122*** -0.082*** 
  (0.056)    (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.054) Trust 0.174*** 0.212*** 0.219*** 0.206*** 
  (0.108)    (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.102) Knowledge 0.097*** 0.047*** -0.030*** 0.115*** 
  (0.198)    (0.200)  (0.206)  (0.191) Experience with Autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome (1=Yes) 
2.432*** 2.391*** 2.712*** 2.623*** 
 (1.063)    (1.085)  (1.127)  (1.081) 
Frequency of Web use (1=High) 0.577*** 0.703*** 0.758*** 1.007*** 
  (0.478)    (0.477)  (0.485)  (0.481) Age 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.010*** 
  (0.030)    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029) Gender (1=Male) -0.172*** -0.533*** -0.768*** -0.586*** 
  (0.448)    (0.440)  (0.462)  (0.445) Race (1=White, not Hispanic) 1.833***     1.613***   1.566*** 1.661*** 
  (0.491)    (0.465)  (0.477)  (0.459) Income -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.065*** 
  (0.062)    (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.060) Education -0.073*** 0.050*** 0.025*** -0.017*** 
  (0.243)    (0.234)  (0.234)  (0.230) Health insurance coverage for child 
(1=Yes) 
2.028*** 1.831*** 1.694*** 1.859*** 
 (0.629)    (0.645)  (0.671)  (0.633) 
Number of children (siblings) in family -0.572***   -0.518*** -0.556*** -0.588*** 
  (0.193)   (0.192)  (0.194)  (0.201) 
Child’s age -0.049***  -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.021*** 
  (0.049)   (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
Intercept -2.477***   0.369*** 1.590*** 1.745*** 
  (1.612)   (1.608)  (1.681)  (1.744) Degree of freedom *. 596 *. 587 *. 594 *. 592 
Residual deviance  170.97  180.54  175.39  176.09 
AIC  200.97  210.54  205.39  206.09 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. (Standard errors in parentheses) 
   
children in family.  Those who have acquaintances diagnosed with autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome, who are white, who have fewer children, and whose child is covered with 
health insurance are more likely (with statistical significance) to have their child receive 
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some or all recommended vaccines with statistical significance in all models than those 
who do not have autism experience, who are not white, who have more children, and 
whose child is not covered with health insurance.  
Table 36. Logistic Regression Results: Effect of Parents’ Vaccine Policy Beliefs on 
Their Child Receiving SOME or ALL Recommended Vaccines 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
Vaccination (0=Some; 1=All) 
Parameters Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Preference toward mandatory vaccination 
policy 
0.473***    -***    -***    -*** 
 (0.074)    Preference toward religious exemption 
policy 
   -*** -0.189***    -***    -*** 
  (0.061)   Preference toward philosophical exemption 
policy 
   -***    -*** -0.194***    -*** 
   (0.061)  Parents, not government, as chief 
immunization decision makers 
   -***    -***   -*** -0.109*** 
    (0.068) Perceived prevalence of disease -0.063*** -0.034*** -0.027*** -0.029*** 
  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.029) Trust 0.062*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 
  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.058) Knowledge 0.068*** 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.153*** 
  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.095) Experience with Autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome (1=Yes) 
-0.772*** -0.802*** -0.773*** -0.713*** 
 (0.279)  (0.277)  (0.274)  (0.271) 
Frequency of Web use (1=High) -0.136*** -0.219*** -0.137*** -0.136*** 
  (0.289)  (0.287)  (0.285)  (0.278) Age 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015) Gender (1=Male) -0.394*** -0.496*** -0.522*** -0.418*** 
  (0.255)  (0.248)  (0.247)  (0.242) Race (1=White, not Hispanic) -0.387*** -0.546*** -0.510*** -0.540*** 
  (0.311)  (0.301)  (0.298)  (0.297) Income -0.020*** -0.006*** -0.022*** -0.008*** 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033) Education 0.126*** 0.214*** 0.223*** 0.155*** 
  (0.119)  (0.115)  (0.118)  (0.113) Health insurance coverage for child (1=Yes) 1.037*** 0.756*** 0.862*** 0.895*** 
  (0.462)  (0.456)  (0.449)  (0.436) 
Number of children (siblings) in family 0.151*** 0.194*** 0.177*** 0.163*** 
  (0.126)  (0.124)  (0.123)  (0.122) 
Child’s age 0.031*** 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Intercept -3.359*** -0.919*** -0.912*** -1.253*** 
  (0.987)  (0.984)  (0.982)  (0.989) Degree of freedom *. 561 *. 552 *. 559 *. 557 
Residual deviance  460.69  480.70  487.90  500.86 
AIC  490.69  510.70  517.90  530.86 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. (Standard errors in parentheses) 
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As displayed in Table 36, logistic regression results show how parents’ opinions 
on childhood vaccination policies influence their behavioral decisions regarding 
whether their children ultimately receive some or all recommended vaccines.  As  
hypothesized, ceteris paribus, those who support mandatory vaccinations (Model 15) 
and oppose religious exemptions (Model 16) and philosophical exemptions (Model 17) 
are more likely to have a child who has received all recommended vaccines with 
statistical significance.  However, parents’ support of strong parental decision-making 
rights on the matter of immunization does not influence the likelihood of their own 
children receiving all recommended vaccines with any statistical significance (Model 
18).  In terms of control variables, those who have acquaintances diagnosed with autism 
or Asperger’s syndrome (Model 15-18), who are white (Model 16-18), and whose child 
is covered with health insurance (Model 15-18) are more likely to have their child 
receive all recommended vaccines with statistical significance than those who do not 
have autism experience, who are non-white, and who do not have health insurance 
coverage for their child. 
The following (Table 37) presents the combined (summed) results of 
corresponding likelihood ratio !! statistics across two analyses of deviance tables 
derived from the results of previous logit analyses shown in Table 35 and 36, and the 
results of likelihood ratio tests to examine the statistical significance of the effects of 
each independent variable on the aforementioned trichotomous dependent variable 
related to child vaccination.  As this study hypothesized, effects of parents’ policy 
beliefs on mandatory vaccination (combined results from Model 11 and 15), religious 
exemptions (combined results from Model 12 and 16), philosophical exemptions 
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(combined results from Model 13 and 17), and the emphasis on parental rights in 
immunizing their child (combined results from Model 14 and 18) are all statistically 
significantly related to the trichotomous dependent variable of child vaccination. 
Control variables also exhibit statistical significance.  Parents’ experience with autism 
or Asperger’s syndrome, their race, health insurance coverage of child, and number of 
children in family are statistically significantly related to their behavior regarding child 
vaccinations in all combined model results. 
Table 37. Analysis of Deviance: Effects of Parents’ Vaccine Policy Beliefs on the 
Likelihood of Their Child Receiving NO, SOME, or ALL Recommended Vaccines 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
Vaccination (0=None; 1=Some; 2=All) 
 
Parameters 
Combined results from 
Model 11 
and 15 
Model 12 
and 16 
Model 13 
and 17 
Model 14 
and 18 
Preference toward mandatory vaccination policy 55.85*** -***  -***  -*** 
Preference toward religious exemption policy -*** 11.63***  -***  -*** 
Preference toward philosophical exemption policy -*** -*** 17.66***  -*** 
Parents as chief immunization decision makers -*** -***  -*** 7.79*** 
Perceived prevalence of disease 9.29*** 6.12*** 5.91*** 3.27*** 
Trust 3.51*** 9.20*** 9.63*** 8.75*** 
Knowledge 0.70*** 1.76*** 0.86*** 2.96*** 
Experience with Autism (1=Yes) 17.25*** 16.99*** 18.76*** 18.01*** 
Frequency of Web use (1=High) 1.66*** 2.72*** 2.64*** 4.50*** 
Age 0.52*** 0.19*** 0.75*** 0.99*** 
Gender (1=Male) 2.56*** 5.50*** 7.33*** 4.76*** 
Race (1=White, not Hispanic) 16.72*** 16.17*** 14.41*** 17.28*** 
Income 1.71*** 1.13*** 1.35*** 1.22*** 
Education 1.23*** 3.59*** 3.72*** 1.91*** 
Health insurance coverage for child (1=Yes) 14.37*** 10.41*** 9.46*** 12.12*** 
Number of children (siblings) in family 10.04*** 9.61*** 10.21*** 10.25*** 
Child’s age 2.18*** 3.10*** 1.78*** 1.41*** 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. (Note: Numbers presented in the table are likelihood ratio !! 
statistics and the degrees of freedom for each variable in the likelihood test is 2.) 
     
Figure 7 shows how parents’ beliefs on vaccination policies influence their 
behavioral decisions with regard to the vaccination of their child.  The vertical axis 
represents predicted fitted probability of vaccination, while the horizontal axis shows 
parent’s degree of support for mandatory vaccination policy represented on a 7 point  
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Figure 7. Effect of Mandatory Vaccine Policy Preference on Predicted Probability 
of Vaccination 
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rising scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).  The dashed line indicates 
the probability that a survey respondent’s child receives no recommended vaccines.  
The short dashed line shows the probability that a child received some recommended 
vaccines, and the solid line represents the probability of a child receiving all 
recommended vaccines.  
Children of parents who strongly support mandatory vaccination policy are more 
likely to receive all recommended vaccines, and less likely to receive only some or no 
vaccines (first row).  The patterns of these relationships hold for parents who have 
different socio-demographic characteristics; however, overall, those without autism 
experience (second row) and whose children have health insurance coverage (fourth 
row) are more likely to have taken their children for all recommended vaccines and less 
likely to have had their children take only some or no recommended vaccines than those 
who have experienced autism and whose children have no health insurance.  However, 
there are no discernable differences in the patterns of these relationships between 
parents who are white and who are not (third row). 
5.5. Summary 
Acknowledging growing concerns for public health, along with the reemergence of 
infectious diseases such as pertussis and measles in certain communities in the United 
States, this chapter mainly seeks to answer how American parents’ policy related beliefs 
translate into their behavior regarding child vaccinations.  Clearly, parents’ beliefs 
regarding vaccine benefits and risks and their opinions on vaccination policies directly 
translate into their child vaccination related behavior in most cases.  Parents who 
perceive high levels of societal and individual benefits from vaccination, a high (very 
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favorable) benefit-risk ratio, and low levels of individual risk are more strongly 
motivated to have their child (or children) receive all recommended vaccines, whereas 
those who perceive low levels of societal and individual vaccination benefits, a low 
(very unfavorable) benefit-risk ratio, and high levels of individual risk are less 
motivated to vaccinate their child with all recommended vaccinations.  In addition, 
parents who more strongly support mandatory vaccination policy and feel less support 
for religious and philosophical exemptions and parental decision-making rights 
regarding the immunization of children are more strongly motivated to have their own 
child receive all the recommended vaccines.  Meanwhile, those who support mandatory 
vaccinations less and various exemptions and parental decision making rights more, are 
less motivated to have their child receive all recommended vaccines.  This chapter also 
found that other modifying factors, such as a parent’s autism related experience, 
parent’s race, and health insurance coverage for his or her child also influence such 
belief-behavior relationships.  For instance, while parents’ perception of a high benefit-
risk ratio of vaccination and their support for mandatory vaccination policy are 
positively associated with the likelihood of a child taking all recommended vaccines, 
parents who personally experienced or encountered autism or Asperger’s syndrome, 
who are non-Hispanic white, and whose child does not have any health insurance 
coverage are less likely to have their child receive all recommended vaccinations in 
comparison with those who did not experience autism and Asperger’s syndrome, who 
are not white19, and whose child has health insurance coverage.  Additionally, when a 
child has more siblings, the parent is less likely to vaccinate him or her.  
                                                
19 There is no statistically significant difference between white parents and non-white parents in 
terms of the positive relationship between their support for mandatory vaccination and the 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
As the vaccine controversy continues to deepen in the United States, this dissertation 
research addresses how we can better understand and deal with this issue in respect to 
public policy in general and public health policy in particular.  Based upon original data 
from a nationwide Internet survey of 1,213 adults conducted in 2010, this study 
scrutinizes ways in which individuals’ values and beliefs, notably cultural 
predispositions, shape their differing opinions on the benefits and risks associated with 
childhood vaccinations and controversial vaccination policies, including mandatory 
vaccinations and religious/philosophical exemptions, and key related issues of 
governance.  This study also attempts to explain how parents’ subjective expected 
utility of vaccinations (derived from their perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks) and 
their beliefs regarding current vaccine policies actually translate into their vaccination-
related behaviors in regards to the immunization of their own children. 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) explains how individuals’ grid-group 
cultural orientations shape their perceptions regarding vaccine benefits and risks at both 
the societal and individual levels.  As Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky’s cultural 
theory of risk perception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) claims, empirical findings 
derived from robust regression analysis with heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
estimation of errors and Bayesian posterior simulations reveal that those with a strong 
hierarch orientation tend to envision greater vaccination benefits and smaller risks, 
while those with a strong fatalist tendency are inclined to emphasize risks and downplay 
benefits.  Situated between hierarchs and fatalists, egalitarians are prone to perceive 
greater benefits and smaller risks than individualists. 
                                                                                                                                          
likelihood of child taking all recommended vaccines. 
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Knowing that the benefits and the risks of vaccinations are understood as a 
sociopolitical construct and a reflection of the competing values and beliefs of different 
members of society (notably manifested in the form of cultural predispositions), this 
dissertation research proceeds to examine whether people still hold similar (value 
motivated, rather than factual evidence based) reasoning patterns when they are 
involved in policy debates on vaccination.  The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) 
seeks to explain how individuals’ fundamental values regarding a preferred social 
ordering shape their opinions on controversial vaccination policies and key related 
issues of governance.  As Aaron Wildavsky’s cultural theory of policy preference 
formation (Wildavsky, 1987) posits, empirical findings grounded on robust regression 
analysis with heteroskedasticity consistent error covariance estimation and Bayesian 
posterior simulations show that cultural biases have a significant impact on the 
formation of preferences toward various vaccination policies and governance issues. 
Hierarchs and egalitarians are more likely to be pro-vaccination, while individualists 
and (especially) fatalists tend to oppose this view.  Hierarchs advocate mandatory 
vaccination, disapprove of religious and philosophical exemptions, and believe that the 
government, not parents, should control childhood immunizations.  By contrast, fatalists 
are inclined to reject mandatory vaccination policy in favor of religious and 
philosophical exemptions and the role of parents in determining vaccination of children. 
Egalitarians’ pro-vaccination inclination is relatively weaker and less consistent than 
hierarchs’, while individualists’ anti-vaccination leanings are overall less robust than 
those of fatalists. 
Government health authorities can utilize knowledge concerning the way 
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individuals’ cultural orientations shape vaccine benefit-risk perception and policy 
preference to improve risk communication between the government, experts, and the 
lay public and to encourage “desirable” (public health enhancing) changes in the 
general public’s attitude toward vaccine risks and related policies.  However, this 
assertion alone does not provide much assistance in terms of practical implications as to 
how an actual policy outcome can be realized through changes not only in individuals’ 
attitudes and thoughts, but also in their behaviors.  This line of thought led to the third 
empirical chapter (Chapter 5), which essentially examines how American parents’ 
policy related beliefs (e.g., their perceptions of vaccine benefits and risks and related 
policy preferences) actually translate into their behaviors regarding child vaccinations. 
The results of an empirical analysis using nested dichotomies logistic regression reveal 
that parents who perceive high levels of societal and individual benefit from 
vaccination, a high (very favorable) benefit-risk ratio, and low levels of individual risk 
are more strongly motivated to have their own child (or children) receive all 
recommended vaccines.  In addition, parents who more strongly support mandatory 
vaccination policy and are not in favor of religious and philosophical exemptions and 
parental decision-making rights regarding children’s immunizations are more strongly 
motivated to have their own child(ren) receive all recommended vaccines. 
The most important element of these findings is that the vaccine policy debate 
and related vaccination behaviors are not solely based upon efficacy in reduction of 
disease or the resulting societal benefits and costs.  Rather, it actually gains 
considerable momentum from the clash of worldviews.  An intrinsic value dimension, 
notably in the form of grid-group cultural orientation, is reflected in the way this debate 
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and related vaccination behaviors have come to stand in for an overarching contest 
among competing sets of societal norms.  Many government health authorities and 
experts believe that people oppose vaccinations because of their own inability to access 
quality vaccine-related knowledge or due to dissemination of false information.  In 
response, health advocates have tried to enlighten the general public and thereby 
increase compliance with mandatory vaccination policies, thereby improving public 
health.  Of course, proliferation of quality knowledge and sound information provided 
by the scientific community is essential.  However, the results of this analysis show that 
vaccine benefit/risk perceptions, preferences for vaccine-related policies, and 
consequent vaccination behaviors are significantly influenced by individual values and 
beliefs regarding desirable social relationships, notably in the form of cultural 
predispositions.  Furthermore, from a cultural cognition perspective, individuals’ 
cultural biases work as a set of heuristics in the processing of pertinent information and 
in the course of reasoning (Kahan and Braman, 2006; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and 
Braman, 2011; Silva, Jenkins-Smith and Barke, 2007; Silva and Jenkins-Smith, 2007). 
That is, when individuals with a particular cultural bias encounter new information, they 
will reinterpret it through the filters of their own cultural biases and use the results in 
their reasoning and policy evaluation.  Even the seemingly unrelated matter of crediting 
expertise, which is integral to deciding whether a policy is beneficial or risky, is subject 
to cultural cognition (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman, 2011).  With this in mind, 
three related concepts from risk communication perspectives may prove useful to public 
health authorities in the effective dissemination of vaccine-related knowledge: identity 
affirmation, pluralistic advocacy, and narrative framing (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and 
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Braman, 2010: 23-24).  Firstly, identity affirmation has shown that individuals are more 
likely to embrace information that appears to reinforce their own worldviews and reject 
conclusions that undermine their values. Individualists, for example, are more likely to 
respond to vaccine messages that make the point that the decision not to vaccinate 
children imposes involuntary risks on others than they are to appeals to authority and 
expertise.  Additionally, the concept of pluralistic advocacy highlights how individuals 
reject messages from experts they believe do not share their cultural values and 
reflexively trust information from experts whose (presumed) values align with their 
own.  Moreover, if experts representing an array of different values appear to fall on 
both sides of the fence on a given issue, then the individual may be less prone to engage 
in identity-protective cognition with respect to the information these experts provide. 
Third, the analytical results suggest that information campaigns for vaccine programs 
would benefit from narrative framing (Jones and McBeth, 2010), in which custom-fit 
templates or culturally nuanced narratives are employed that bolster feelings of 
validation for a particular cultural group.  Such customized messages are designed to 
appeal to their target groups by assigning positive value to their worldview, thereby 
garnering more attention for crucial public messages carrying vaccine-related 
information.  
Obviously, there is not much that can be done to directly affect most of the 
demographic factors which impact parents’ beliefs (and thus, their behaviors) in regard 
to vaccinating their children.  However, having an awareness of how these 
characteristics influence different people can help the government ascertain which are 
the most appropriate target groups for their policy endeavors.  For example, the 
109 
government should amplify its efforts to engage white individuals who are personally 
acquainted with, or related to, a person who has autism or Asperger’s syndrome, 
regardless of whether the vaccine-autism link argument is correct.  In addition, the 
results of this study show that those who do not have health insurance coverage for their 
children tend to avoid vaccinations.  In order to increase the vaccination rate, then, the 
United States government should intensify its efforts to improve the national health 
insurance coverage rate. 
This array of research findings poses more fundamental inquiries concerning 
policy process, which lays the path for my future research agenda.  The first is whether 
empirical findings from the aforementioned analyses of the general public would hold 
for other major individual policy actors in the related policy subsystems, especially for 
those who are members of elite groups (e.g., medical scientists, health care 
professionals, activist groups, etc.).  Should I be able to demonstrate that such elite 
members possess similar patterns of policy reasoning and policy related behaviors in 
comparison with the general public, this could provide an opportunity for systemic 
explanations of a fundamental theoretical element of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), a major policy process theory, which 
states that individual policy actors in a given policy subsystem who share similar 
fundamental values and beliefs also share views on policy problems and preferred 
solutions and accordingly organize coalitions to advocate their own positions, while 
competing with other advocacy coalitions composed of individual actors who have 
opposing (or different) views on policy-related issues within a particular subsystem. 
Another important question is how to explain the way in which competing 
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advocacy coalitions with differing policy views solidify the organization of their 
coalitions and gain support for their positions from the general public in a given policy 
subsystem in a pluralistic democracy.  What I have focused upon in this regard is a 
systemic investigation of the role of policy narratives that can be broadly defined as a 
story frame composed of messages based upon “reconstructed” factual evidences that 
competing advocacy coalitions utilize to sell their own policy positions in a debate 
within a policy subsystem.  My previous findings based on an Internet survey 
experiment involving over 2,000 respondents conducted in the springs of 2009 and 
2010 suggests that policy narratives worked only when their messages are congruent 
with the prior values and beliefs of the various members of the general public on the 
global climate change policy issue (Jones and Song, 2011).  I would like to expand the 
scope of this research and investigate if these findings also hold true for other policy 
domains, including vaccine controversies. 
Finally, this research (especially Chapter 5) provides groundwork for the future 
research agenda on how individuals’ values and beliefs translate into their policy 
behavior.  A significant number of policy issues, including childhood vaccination 
policy, require “desirable” changes in behavior of individual members of society, which 
will ultimately lead to “desirable” social changes needed in order to resolve crucial 
social problems.  However, most scholarly works in public policy have focused on how 
policy agendas are set, how collective decisions are made, and how policies change 
over time at the collective level, and individual actors’ perceptions of policy problems 
and preferences toward related policies at the individual level.  Of course, these 
perspectives are very important.  Yet we also should pay attention to what explains 
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individual actors’ policy behaviors (Schneider and Ingram, 1990), which provides some 
practical traction for determining whether a given policy actually achieves what it 
intends.  The findings of this research suggest that individual actors’ behaviors are 
motivated by their beliefs, notably subjective expected utility for policy actions and 
their preferences toward existing policies, all of which are grounded on more intrinsic 
personal values, notably grid-group cultural orientations.  This is certainly true in a case 
like that of vaccination policy in the United States, which is simultaneously constituted 
of multiple contradictory policies (e.g., mandatory vaccination and religious and 
philosophical exemptions).  Therefore, theoretical models that can explain individual 
level policy behavior should be further developed.  
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